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I. ABSTRACT 
In a global electronic market the role of trade usages must be 
reinvigorated to better suit the needs of market participants. Con-
trary to the approach to trade usages often adopted by courts and 
scholars, usages should not be seen as merely a device to interpret 
disputed terms in a contract. Rather, they should be viewed as a 
legal foundation for existing and new trade practices and, therefore, 
as a source of authority for and legal obligation arising from such 
practices. In sum, they should be regarded as a means by which 
participants in global eiectronic markets can engage in self-regula-
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tion. 
The world's largest financial market, the global currency bazaar, 
is an outstanding case study of the need to reinvigorate trade usages 
in a cross-border, high-technology market. In brokered foreign cur-
rency transactions, a practice called "switches" lacks a legal founda-
tion. In a switch, one bank attempts to rescind a foreign exchange 
contract because the counterparty to that contract is an undesirable 
credit risk exposure. The bank further attempts to conclude a new 
contract with a different counterparty on the same terms and condi-
tions as the first contract. By switching counterparties, the bank 
seeks to expunge the undesirable credit risk, and preserve the bene-
fits of the initial contract. 
However, whether a switch is legally permissible, and whether it 
effectively rescinds one contract and creates another, is uncertain. By 
reinvigorating the concept of a trade usage and recognizing a switch 
as a reinvigorated usage, a legal foundation for it would exist. Banks 
trading foreign exchange would then be able to regulate their credit 
risk exposures by switching counterparties. Indeed, to address con-
cerns of government regulators, it is proposed that banks further 
refine this practice by developing a five-minute right of rescission us-
age. 
For three reasons, self-regulation through reinvigorated trade 
usages is needed. First, it has several advantages. It will reduce 
uncertainty, protect expectations, provide flexibility, and promote 
efficiency. Second, alternative legal foundations-namely, rule-based 
regulation through contract rules on assignment and adequate assur-
ances of performance-may exacerbate uncertainties and not repre-
sent a Pareto improvement. Third, the process of domestic and inter-
national contract law reform cannot anticipate and meet the needs of 
banks in the global currency bazaar regarding credit risk. This pro-
cess is reactive and cumbersome. 
Business usage may . . . provide a way of doing business 
without the aid of law (though not in violation of it). The 
means of bringing it within the legal regime should be avail-
able. The modem state has more and more tried to provide its 
subjects with a comprehensive, just and coercive regime for 
the settlement of man-to-man controversies.1 
To the extent that a commercial code must acknowledge and 
1. STATE OF NEW YORK, LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE - PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 48 
(1955). 
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accommodate a distinct mercantile community, the UCC has 
failed. 2 
II. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF TRADE USAGES 
A. Argument 
In order to meet the needs of participants in global electronic 
markets, the concept of a usage-of trade should be reinvigorated.3 No 
longer should a usage be regarded as a mere interpretive device trot-
ted out by a court to resolve a dispute about a contractual term. It 
should be seen as a legal foundation for a practice engaged in by 
market participants. As such, it should confer legitimacy and authori-
ty on that practice, and be a source of obligation for the participants. 
In short, trade usages should be seen as a means of self-regulation. 
In this reinvigorated role, a trade usage can reduce uncertainty, 
protect expectations, provide flexibility, and foster efficiency. Alterna-
tives to reinvigorated usages do not offer these advantages. First, 
express statutory rules of contract fail to address adequately the 
pressing needs of participants in global electronic markets. In that 
sense, Chen's above-quoted conclusion is correct. Application of statu-
tory rules may generate uncertainty and not yield potential Pareto 
improvements.' Second, the process of reforming contract law is too 
cumbersome and reactive to anticipate and meet the participants' 
needs.5 Changes wrought may help in the long run but cannot possi-
2. Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and Content: The Uniform Commercial Code 
as Law Merchant, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 91, 106 (1992). 
3. Usages of trade are governed by section 1-205 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C.). Unless otherwise noted, all references herein to provisions of 
the U.C.C. are to the official 1990 version published by the American Law Insti-
tute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
The term "electronic" as used herein includes telephonic communication 
links, electronic messaging systems, and computer-to-computer interfaces. 
4. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
5. The importance of the current project to revise Article 2 is evinced by re-
cent law review articles about the matter. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, A Pragmatic Strate· 
gy For the Scope of Sales Law, the Statute of Frauds, and the Global Currency 
Bazaar, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 1 (discussing proposed revisions to the definition of 
"goods" in section 2-105 and statute of frauds in section 2-201 in relation to the 
needs of foreign exchange market participants); Symposium, (The Revision of Arti-
cle 2), 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1299-1864 (1994). An important body of literature 
on contract law reform in the context of global electronic markets concerns private 
contractual relationships and electronic data interchange (EDI). See, e.g., Amelia H. 
Boss, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting Toward a Global 
Environment, 13 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 31 (1992) (discussing the contribution of 
EDI agreements to the facilitation of global electronic commerce). 
1995] REINVIGORATED TRADE USAGES 867 
bly meet their needs in the short-term. 
The global currency bazaar-the market for trading foreign 
exchange-is an outstanding case study of a global electronic market 
in which to explore the need to reinvigorate trade usages.6 In this 
bazaar, banks must manage carefully credit risk and Herstatt risk.7 
The extent and magnitude of these risks are difficult to ascertain 
when foreign exchange contracts are arranged through a broker act-
ing as an agent for the partially disclosed bank principals. 8 In cer-
6. The term "currency" as used herein includes exchanges of credits to bank 
account balances denominated in a particular foreign currency. 
7. Credit risk is the risk of nonpayment by the counterparty. CHARLES J. 
WOELFEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 270-71 (10th ed. 1994) (The 
counterparty is the other or opposite party in a transaction.). In the context of a 
foreign exchange transaction, credit risk is the risk that one bank will not receive 
payment of a foreign currency owed by its counterparty. 
"Herstatt risk" is a species of credit risk and refers to the possibility that 
one party delivers foreign currency to its counterparty pursuant to its payment 
obligation but does not receive delivery of the currency owed by the counterparty. 
The nondelivery occurs because the counterparty fails, or is closed by regulatory 
authorities, before it has the opportunity to satisfy its payment obligation, and 
because the counterparty is located in a different time zone from the first party. 
The term "Herstatt risk" arises from the famous 1974 case in which a 
German bank (Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt KG.a.A.) that had entered into foreign 
exchange contracts was closed by German bank regulators. See Delbrueck & Co. v. 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 609 F.2d 1047, 1049-51 (1979). In the 
case, Herstatt had received settlement of foreign currency to which it was entitled 
under the contracts, but was closed by the authorities before it could fulfill its set-
tlement obligations to its counterparty (Delbrueck & Company). "Herstatt risk" 
arises whenever the settlement of the two portions or "legs" of a spot foreign ex-
change transaction do not occur simultaneously. The settlements never occur simul-
taneously when the parties to the transaction are located in different time zones. 
Hereinafter, unless distinguished expressly, "credit risk" is meant to encap-
sulate "Herstatt risk." 
B. Foreign exchange brokers play a vital role in linking banks that want to 
buy or sell foreign currencies. In nine countries - Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Hong Kong, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, United States -
about one-third of all foreign exchange transactions are arranged through brokers. 
In France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, the proportion is 44-47 percent. In Japan, 
25 percent of transactions are arranged by brokers. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS (BASLE, SWITZERLAND), CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF FOREIGN EX-
CHANGE MARKET ACTMTY IN APRIL 1992 Table VI at 21, 23-24 (1993) [hereinafter, 
1992 BIS SURVEY]. In all such transactions, the brokers act as agents for partially 
disclosed principals. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(2) (1958) [here-
inafter, RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY] (stating that "[i]f the other party has notice 
that the agent is or may be acting for a principal but has no notice of the 
principal's identity, the principal· for whom the agent is acting is a partially dis-
closed principal."). Questions of agency law do not affect the analysis herein. See 
id. at § 26-27, 50-51. 
Transactions not arranged through brokers are accomplished by banks deal-
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tain transactions, a bank needs to avoid unwanted and possibly im-
prudent risks by rescinding a foreign exchange contract with one 
party and forming a new contract, on the same terms and conditions 
as the rescinded contract, with a different party. 
Rules on assignment and adequate assurances of future perfor-
mance do not satisfy this need. Nor can the bank wait for assistance 
from those responsible for reforming contract law rules. Instead, 
resolving uncertainties about credit risk can be addressed through a 
market practice called "switches" whereby one party is substituted 
for another in a foreign exchange contract. This practice illustrates 
(1) why the concept of a trade usage should be reinvigorated and (2) 
how a reinvigorated usage functions as a self-regulatory device. Fur-
ther, to address concerns of government regulators, it is proposed 
that banks trading foreign exchange adapt this practice by develop-
ing a five-minute right of rescission usage. This refinement would 
give a bank five minutes from the time it learned the identity of its 
counterparty to assess the credit risk associated with the proposed 
counterparty, rescind a contract if the risk is unacceptable, demand 
that its broker obtain a new counterparty, and switch the new for the 
unacceptable counterparty. 
B. Why the Global Currency Bazaar? 
The size of the global currency bazaar is one reason why this 
market is an outstanding case study of the regulation of uncertainty 
through reinvigorated trade usages.9 It is the world's largest finan-
cial market. 10 Every day, an average of one trillion dollars worth of 
foreign currencies are traded in this bazaar.11 The bazaar is rapidly 
ing directly with one another. In direct dealing situations, an automated dealing 
system may facilitate the negotiation and consummation of the transaction. /d. at 
§ 24. Sponsors of such systems include Reuters, Quotron Systems, Inc., and Minex 
. Corp. See, e.g., Bankers Trust and Chase to Use Minex Foreign-Exchange Service, 
AM. BANKER, Dec. 30, 1992, at 2. 
9. For discussions of the foreign exchange market, see ANDREW KRIEGER, 
THE MONEY BAZAAR (1992); J. ORLIN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETs 
63-174 (2d ed. 1991); RUDI WEISWEILER, HOW THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
WORKS (1990). 
10. See GRABBE, supra note 9, at 65. 
11. 1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, at 5-7. The exact figure is $1.354 tril-
lion in total reported gross turnover. After eliminating double-counting and gaps in 
reporting, "net net" global turnover is an average of $880 billion per day. The 
turnover statistics are for spot, forward, and derivative foreign exchange contracts. 
For a discussion of the differences among these types of contracts, see Raj Bhala, 
Risk 1'ra.tk-offs in the Foreign Exchange Spot, Forward and Derivative Markets, 1 
THE FINANCIER 34 (1994); B. Albert, A Foreign Exchange Primer for Commercial 
' 
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getting bigger: average daily turnover increased 35 percent between 
April 1989 and April 1992.12 
The strong U.S. public interest in the bazaar is a second justifi-
cation for using this case study to argue for a stronger legal effect for 
trade usages. U.S. commercial and investment banks are active trad-
ers in the bazaar, U.S. brokerage companies regularly arrange deals 
among traders, and the Federal Reserve frequently intervenes in the 
bazaar to affect the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar relative to other 
currencies. Notwithstanding the prominence of American institutions, 
the U.S. is ineluctably involved in the bazaar because of the promi-
nence of its currency therein. Foreign exchange trading entails an 
exchange of currencies between two parties, and the U.S. dollar is by 
far the most widely traded currency in the bazaar. In 82 percent of 
all trades, the U.S. dollar is bought or sold against another foreign 
currency .13 
The characteristics of the foreign exchange market are a third 
reason why the global currency bazaar is an outstanding case study 
of trade usages and electronic commerce. It is a highly liquid, twenty-
four hour, global, high-technology bazaar. 14 Indeed, the enormous 
and growing trading volumes should not be surprising because the 
bazaar never closes. 15 The players are thousands of commercial and 
investment banks from around the world. While London, New York, 
and Tokyo are the most important trading centers, 16 there is no cen-
· Lending Officers, 2 COMM. LENDING REv. 40 (1987). 
12. 1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, Table I at 6. With respect to the "net-
net" global turnover, the increase during the same period was 42 percent. 1992 
BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, Table I at 6. 
13. 1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, at 8, Table Ila at 9. The most signifi-
cant other currencies are German deutsche marks (which figure on one side of 40 
percent of all transactions), Japanese yen (which figure on one side of 23 percent 
of all transactions), and English pounds (which figure on one side of 14 percent of 
all transactions). 1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, at 8, Table Ila at 9. 
14. In general, liquidity refers to the amount of time required to turn an 
asset into cash - the shorter the time period, the more liquid the asset. See 
WOELFEL, supra note 7, at 703. In the context of the foreign exchange market, it 
is the amount of time required for one currency to be exchanged for another. A 
key reason for the liquidity of certain currencies (e.g., dollar, yen, pounds, and 
marks) in the foreign exchange market is the large number of banks that trade 
those currencies. One observer estimates that the largest 8-10 banks account for 
only 30-40 percent of daily turnover, thus smaller institutions play a very promi-
nent role in the market. D. Shirreff, Banks and Forex, GLOBAL. FINANCE, June 
1988, at 34. Naturally, trading in some currencies (like dollars, yen, and pounds) 
is more liquid than other currencies (like United Arab Emirates dinars, Indi~ 
rupees, and Turkish lira). 
15. GRABBE, supra note 9, at 66. 
16. The largest average daily turnover occurs in London ($300 billion), the 
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tralized exchange analogous to a stock market. The players are scat-
tered across the globe, and the fastest growth rates in trading vol-
umes are in nascent financial centers such as Madrid, Athens, and 
Copenhagen.17 -Linked by fiber-optic telephone and computer lines 
and satellite communication systems, the bank principals and their 
agent brokers make full use of the products of the telecommunica-
tions revolution. 18 
United States ($192 billion), and Japan ($126 billion). 1992 BIS SURVEY, supra 
note 8, at 13, Table IV at 14. See also James Blitz, All Change in Foreign Ex-
changes, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at 15. 
17. Between April 1989 and April 1992, turnover in Spain and Greece in-
creased by more than 170 percent, and Denmark's growth rate was 112 percent. 
1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, at 13. 
18. As one observer explains: 
The foreign exchange market is an over-the-counter market. That is, there 
is no one physical location where traders get together to exchange curren-
cies. Rather, traders are located in the offices of major commercial banks 
around the world and communicate using computer terminals, telephones, 
telexes, and other information channels. If a foreign exchange (FX) trader 
in a bank in New York deals dollars for pounds with an FX trader in 
London, the traders will, over the phone, agree on a price. Each trader 
will then enter the trade in the bank's computer or other record system, 
and then get on with the business of trading. The mechanics of actually 
transferring the currencies are not the traders' concern, so a trade takes a 
few seconds at most. Later, however, the two banks will send each other 
[possibly by electronic means] confirmation messages concerning the details 
of the trade, and will make arrangements for settlement [i.e., performance 
of inter-bank payment obligations] of the traders' contract. The bank in 
New York will turn over a dollar deposit (at some New York bank) to the 
bank in London, and the bank in London will turn over a pound deposit 
(at some London bank) to the bank in New York. This exchange of cur-
rencies will take place entirely in the form of an exchange of electronic 
messages. The messages will be sent through established communications 
networks. 
GRABBE, supra note 9, at 65-66 (emphasis supplied except for "settlement"). As 
Grabbe points out, the most widely used international financial communications 
network is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications 
(SWIFT), a Belgian not-for-profit cooperative organization which began in May 
1977. As of 1990, 3,000 banks in 67 countries were connected and an average of 
1.1 million messages were sent among the banks via SWIFT each day. These elec-
tronic messages, which concern the terms of foreign exchange and other cross-bor-
der financial deals, are transmitted through central, connected operating centers 
located in Brussels, Amsterdam, and Culpeper, Virginia. In turn, the centers are 
connected by data-transmission lines to regional processors, and individual banks 
are connected to such processors. GRABBE, supra note 9, at 66. For an entertaining 
account of life on a foreign exchange trading floor of a major trading institution, 
see J. MADURA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 111-22 (3d ed. 1992). 
With respect to settlement of foreign exchange payment obligations, the 
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) (owned and operated by the 
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C. Organization 
The argument for reinvigorating trade usages in global electron-
ic markets is unveiled in five remaining parts to this article. Part II 
presents a telephonic brokered foreign exchange transaction. This 
Part highlights a credit risk problem and consequent need to switch 
counterparties. 
Part III discusses the parsimonious approach often taken by 
courts and scholars to trade usages. The jurisprudential and textual 
bases for this role are considered and rejected. Part III argues that 
the narrow role is inconsistent with legislative intent and the law 
merchant. 
Part IV offers the argument for using U.C.C. Section 1-205 as a 
legal foundation for the practice of switches.19 This Part shows that 
as a reinvigorated trade usage, a switch is a self-regulatory device 
that provides players in the global currency bazaar with certainty, 
protects their expectations, gives them flexibility, and fosters efficien-
cy in trading. Part IV proposes a five-minute right of rescission usage 
as a refinement to the practice of switches to help resolve the Federal 
Reserve's concerns about that practice.20 Part IV also raises two lin-
gering doubts about the argument. 
Part V argues that alternatives to self-regulation through 
"beefed up" trade usages are unhelpful. The assignment and ade-
quate assurances rules in Sections 2-210 and 2-609, respectively, are 
considered as means of regulating credit risk. Application of the as-
I 
New York Clearing House) and Fedwire (owned and operated by the twelve Feder-
al Reserve Banks) are most commonly used. See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid 
of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J. 347, 374 (1993-94). 
19. Unless otherwise noted, all references to a "section" or "sections" are to 
the U.C.C. 
20. There is a well-founded statutory basis for the Federal Reserve's regula-
tory authority over commercial banks that participate in the foreign exchange 
market. Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1841-50 (1994), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1811-34 (1994), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) is 
the appropriate federal banking agency with respect to (i.e., regulator oO bank 
holding companies (BHCs) and banks with state charters that are members of the 
Federal Reserve System (state member banks). The Federal Reserve, along with 
the other eleven regional Reserve Banks, exercises regulatory authority over BHCs 
and state member banks under authority delegated by the Board pursuant to the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1994). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 248(a), 
(k), 1813(q)(2). Along with registered broker-dealers regulated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, commercial banks - virtually all of which are held by 
BHCs - are the most important U.S. players in the foreign exchange market. 
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signment rule is rejected because it does not yield a potential Pareto 
improvement,21 and application of the ade.quate assurances rule is 
rejected because of attendant uncertainties. Domestic and interna-
tional commercial law reforms also are evaluated as a possible solu-
tion to the credit risk problem. These are rejected because of their 
cumbersome and reactive nature. 
Part VI presents a synopsis of the aforementioned arguments. It 
concludes that for the foreseeable future, trade usages may be the 
only means by which participants in global electronic markets can 
quickly and effectively resolve uncertainties in their transactions. 
III. SWITCHES: AN ILLUSTRATION 
A. The Attempt to Switch Counterparties 
Suppose Bangkok Bank and Citibank22 seek to enter into a dol-
lar-yen spot foreign-exchange transaction.23 Bangkok Bank wants to 
sell 5 billion yen in exchange for dollars, and Citibank wants to buy 5 
billion yen agai~st dollars. Neither Bangkok Bank nor Citibank is 
aware that each is a potential counterparty of the other, thus the 
critical initial problem is matching the buy and sell interests of the 
two parties. One matching method is for each bank to telephone a 
21. See infra text accompanying note 185. 
22. Bangkok Bank and Citibank each have offices all over the world. It is 
assumed that the Bangkok, Thailand office of Bangkok Bank and the New York 
office of Citibank are involved in the transaction detailed above. 
Bangkok Bank and Citibank are active participants in the foreign exchange 
market not only through their Thai and U.S. offices, respectively, but also through 
offices located around the world. Thus, the hypothetical transaction deliberately 
simulates real-world conditions. 
23. The most basic and significant foreign exchange transaction is a spot. 
1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, at 16-23. Spot contracts account for about half of 
all foreign exchange transactions. A spot contract involves a commitment by one 
party to deliver a specified quantity of one currency against the counterparty's de-
livery of a specified quantity of a second currency. The deliveries are made on the 
value date, which for most currencies is within two business days of the trade 
date (the date on which the contract terms were agreed). In other words, in spot 
foreign exchange transactions the settlement of payment obligations occurs on 
"T 2" (where "T" stands for the trade date). For spot contracts involving Canadian 
dollars and Mexican pesos, the value date may be one day after the trade date 
(T 1). Forward contracts, which are the same as spot contracts except that the 
value date is more than two days after the trade date, are the second most signif-
icant type of transaction. 1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, Table V at 17. 
Of the top ten currency pairs in spot transactions, dollar-mark is the most 
common type, accounting for 29.6 percent of average daily turnover. Dollar-yen 
deals are the second most common type, accounting for 15.7 percent of such turn-
over. 1992 BIS SURVEY, supra note 8, Table lib at 10. 
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number of banks and inquire about interest in a 5 billion dollar-yen 
deal.24 But, direct dealing has two disadvantages. First, calling 
banks is time consuming and perhaps fruitless, particularly if the 
caller lacks comprehensive, up-to-date information about potential 
counterparties. Second, and more importantly, direct dealing does not 
allow for anonymity. As soon as Bangkok Bank asks for price quotes 
on 5 billion yen, other banks will learn it is about to incur a large 
long or short position in yen.25 The other banks may anticipate cor-
rectly that Bangkok Bank seeks to sell yen short.26 In turn, the oth-
24. Alternatively, Bangkok Bank and Citibank may be members of the same 
electronic direct-dealing system sponsored by a third-party vendor. See supra note 
8 (discussing automated dealing systems). 
25. See THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMI'ITEE, ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1986) 
(stating that "[b]y providing participants anonymity until a transaction's size and 
exchange rate is agreed to [sic], brokers contribute to the depth and breadth of the 
market."). A "long" position results from buying a currency. See infra note 26 (dis-
cussing short selling). 
The Foreign Exchange Committee is an independent body sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York [hereinafter, Federal Reserve]. It is comprised 
of representatives from approximately 30 U.S. and foreign commercial banks, U.S. 
investment banks, and foreign exchange brokers, plus officials from the Federal 
Reserve. See THE FOREIGN ExCHANGE COMMI'ITEE, ANNUAL REPORT 78-79, 85 
(1993) [hereinafter, ANNuAL REPORT 1993]. It lacks the legal status of a. self-regu-
latory organization and is akin to a trade association. The comparable body in the 
U.K. is the British Bankers' Association. 
26. Technically, short selling refers to the sale of an asset that the seller 
does not own at the time of sale. The seller must enter into a covering transaction 
whereby the asset is purchased before the seller is obligated to deliver the asset to 
the buyer. 
Short-selling occurs frequently in the global currency bazaar. For an ex-
ample of selling 400 million pounds short against the dollar, see KRIEGER, supra 
note 9, at 65-79. To be sure, if Bangkok Bank sells 5 billion yen short at 101 yen 
per dollar, then it will have to obtain 5 billion yen to cover its short position so 
that it has sufficient yen to deliver to Citibank on the value date. 
Bangkok Bank may cover its short position in a number of ways. First, it 
may take a long position in another spot transaction, i.e., buy yen in the spot 
market. Bangkok Bank risks losing money if the spot rate for yen rises because 
the cost of the cover purchase may exceed the proceeds from the subsequent sale. 
For example, suppose the yen appreciates relative to the dollar in the spot market 
to 99 yen per dollar. Then, Bangkok Bank will have to buy 5 billion yen at that 
spot rate and sell them to Citibank at the previously agreed rate of 101 yen per 
dollar. The purchase will cost Bangkok Bank $50,505,050.51 but the sale will fetch 
only $49,504,950.50, resulting in a loss of $1,000,100.01. In general, Bangkok Bank 
will lose money on the short sale if the yen appreciates beyond 101 yen per dollar. 
Of course, Bangkok Bank would not short sell yen if it thought yen would appreci-
ate. It expects to profit by buying 5 billion yen at, say, 103 yen per dollar and 
selling the yen to Citibank at 101 yen per dollar. 
A second way to cover a short sale in the spot market is to enter into 
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er banks may take dollar-yen positions that undermine Bangkok 
Bank's strategy.27 
Consequently, Bangkok Bank and Citibank deal with each other 
through a foreign exchange broker.28 As agent for a bank, the broker 
specializes in matching parties quickly by using its network of con-
tacts in the international banking community. The broker guarantees 
anonymity to its principal while the contract is being negotiated. The 
transaction may be initiated either by Bangkok Bank or Citibank. 
Suppose Bangkok Bank communicates with a foreign exchange bro-
ker in Bangkok known as the "Thai Broker."29 Undoubtedly, a satel-
lite telecommunications system is used-the Bank and Broker com-
municate by telephone or an electronic messaging system.30 
foreign currency option transaction. Bangkok Bank could buy a call option on yen. 
This option would entitle Bangkok Bank to obtain yen at a pre-set price. Using 
currency options to cover a short position is an example of employing a foreign 
exchange derivative product to hedge an underlying currency exposure. The reverse 
situation also is possible. Short sales can be used to hedge a position in options. 
See KRIEGER, supra note 9, at 65-79. 
27. For example, banks may buy yen knowing that Bangkok Bank will have 
to cover its short position by purchasing 5 billion yen. These banks expect Bang-
kok Bank may buy the yen from them and hope that Bangkok Bank's covering 
purchases will cause the yen to appreciate relative to the dollar. Alternatively, the 
banks may sell yen anticipating that Bangkok Bank ultimately will dump yen, 
which will depress the price. 
28. To be sure, no foreign exchange broker works for free. Use of a foreign 
exchange broker entails a commission. Bangkok Bank and Citibank will have to 
pay a commission to their respective brokers (the Thai and New York Brokers). 
The commission charged may be a percentage fee that is based on the volume. of 
currencies transacted. Because the brokerage market is very competitive, the per-
centage is likely to be quite small. Brokerage fees do not affect the argument 
herein and, therefore, are not considered. 
It is assumed that the agents have actual or apparent authority from their 
respective principals and there are no disputed issues as to their authority to 
enter into contracts on behalf of their principals. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, 
supra note 8, at §§ 26-27 (regarding creation of authority), 50-51 (regarding au-
thority to contract). 
29. Undoubtedly, Bangkok Bank will have used the Thai Broker as its agent 
in the past and, therefore, an established principal-agent relationship exists. It is 
assumed that the Thai Broker acts as agent for Bangkok Bank but not Bangkok 
Bank's counterparty, Citibank. In reality, a single broker may act as the agent for 
both banks. For example, the Bangkok office of the Thai Broker may communicate 
with Bangkok Bank, while the New York office· of the Thai Broker communicates 
with Citibank, and then the two offices of the Thai Broker will communicate with 
each other. Query whether it is appropriate for the same broker to serve as agent 
for two principals. An. agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters in the scope of 
the agency and owes its principal a duty of loyalty, namely, to act solely for the 
benefit of its principal. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 8, §§ 13, 387. 
30. In many instances, telephone conversations between the ba~ and their 
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Bangkok Bank asks for a "spot dollar-yen" quote, and the Thai 
Broker provides Bangkok Bank with a two-way price. Because Bang-
kok Bank does not necessarily indicate to the Thai Broker whether it 
is a potential buyer or seller of yen, the Broker does not learn of the 
Bank's intentions until the Bank proposes a specific deal for the 
Broker to arrange at an exchange rate quoted by the Broker.31 Mod-
em telecommunications systems not only facilitate communication 
but also price discovery. The Thai Broker ascertains the spot rate by 
checking the electronic international financial news reporting servic-
es to which it subscribes. These services provide prices of virtually 
every currency on a computer monitor in the same way that .Lexis 
provides opinions of virtually every U.S. and many foreign courts 
through a linked terminal.32 In addition, the Thai Broker may call 
other foreign exchange brokers, or dealing banks, and ask for quotes. 
Assume the quote is "101-100."33 Bangkok Bank responds by 
brokers, and between brokers, are taped. Electronic messaging systems are direct 
computer-to-computer exchanges. · 
31. KRIEGER, supra note 9, at 31. To say that the Thai Broker quotes Bang-
kok Bank a "two-way rate" means that the Broker tells the Bank trader the (1) 
price at which an unnamed counterparty is ready, willing, and able to buy yen in 
exchange for dollars, the "bid price," and (2) price at which an unnamed 
counterparty is ready, willing, and able to sell yen in exchange for dollars, the 
"offer price." Because of uncertainty as to whether Bangkok Bank will buy or sell 
yen, it is not surprising that two-way rate quotations are the universal practice in 
the foreign-exchange market. Moreover, quoting two-way rates contributes to mar-
ket liquidity. It indicates that the. Thai Broker is willing to arrange either a pur-
chase or sale of yen against dollars on behalf of Bangkok Bank. 
There is a spread between the two quoted prices, known as the bid-offer 
(or bid-ask) spread. The bid price necessarily must be lower than the offer price. If 
it were not, then the counterparty to the transaction would perpetually lose mon-
ey: it would buy yen at a higher price and be forced to sell the yen at a lower 
price. Thus, for example, the bid-offer spread quoted for spot dollar-yen by the 
Thai Broker to Bangkok Bank might be "101-100." This signifies a bid price of 101 
yen per dollar, the price at which some counterparty whose identity is unknown to 
Bangkok Bank is willing to buy yen from Bangkok Bank. It also signifies an offer 
price of 100 yen per dollar, the price at which some counterparty whose identity is 
unknown to Bangkok Bank is willing to sell yen to Bangkok Bank. 
At these rates, a 5 billion yen transaction implies that the undisclosed 
counterparty will pay $49.50 million (the exact figure is $49,504,950.50) for the 
yen, or receive $50 million for the yen. This assures the counterparty that if it 
bought the yen from Bangkok Bank, it could immediately re-sell the yen for a 
profit of $500,000 (the exact figure is $495,049.51) instead of incurring a loss for 
that amount if the bid-offer rates were reversed. 
32. For a discussion of the prevalence of international brokering, see supra 
note 8. 
33. In practice, exchange rates are quoted in more precise terms because 
finer movements are observed that result in large profits and losses. The dollar-
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telling the Thai Broker that it wants to sell 5 billion yen at 101 yen 
per dollar for a total of $49.50 million.34 The Thai Broker immedi-
ately endeavors to find Bangkok Bank an acceptable counterparty. It 
does so by communicating with a foreign exchange broker in New 
York, called the "New York Broker."35 The communication is made 
via an established telephone or electronic link between the Brokers 
known as a "link line." The Thai Broker informs the New York Bro-
ker that its principal is ready, willing, and able to sell 5 billion yen 
at 101 yen per dollar and asks whether the New York Broker can 
find a counterparty to buy the yen. The identity of the Thai Broker's 
principal is not yet disclosed to the New York Broker.36 Therefore, at 
this juncture of the dealmaking process, a counterparty procured by 
yen rate is quoted in terms of hundredths of yen per dollar. For example, the rate 
on Friday, April 15, 1994 was 103.45 yen per dollar. Currency Trading -.Ex-
change Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at C15. 
The price as quoted by a foreign exchange broker reflects the exchange 
rate at which the broker is ready, willing, and able to imd a buyer or seller for a 
particuiar type of foreign currency. Because the broker is an agent and not dealing 
itself in the market, it cannot purchase or sell currency for its own account. In-
deed, even recording a purchase or sale on its own books for a short period is not 
permitted. 
Of course, the prices quoted by foreign exchange brokers ought to be the 
same as those quoted directly by dealers. The spot market for major currencies is 
nearly perfectly competitive, consequently profitable arbitrage opportunities are 
rapidly identified, exploited, and eliminated. Suppose the Thai Broker quotes Bang-
kok Bank a rate for buying yen that is cheaper than the rate prevailing in the 
market and quoted directly by Citibank. For example, Bangkok Bank might be told 
by the Thai Broker that it can buy yen at 106 yen per dollar but Bangkok Bank 
learns that the market bid price is 105 yen per dollar. It would be profitable for 
Citibank to buy 5 billion yen through the Thai Broker and resell the yen directly 
on the market. The Bangkok Bank trader would earn a profit of 120,000,000 yen 
divided by the rate differential of 1 yen per dollar, or $449,236.30. (This profit is 
the difference between the price of $47,169,811.32 paid for the yen at the 106 rate 
and the $47,619,047.62 earned upon resale at the 105 rate.) 
Furthermore, an off-market rate quote ought to be an egregious one. For-
eign exchange brokers all have access to the same information. The New York and 
Thai Brokers can survey dealers like Bangkok Bank and Citibank and thereby 
compile a list of exchange rates. Both Brokers undoubtedly subscribe to an elec-
tronic news service (such as Reuters) and can thereby ascertain current market 
exchange rates. 
34. The exact figure that Citibank will be obligated to pay Bangkok Bank for 
the yen is $49,504,950.50. Payment of the dollars, and the reciprocal yen payment, 
will occur on the value date, which is two days after the trade date. See supra 
note 23. 
35. See supra note 29. 
36. Because the Thai Broker acts as an agent for a partially disclosed princi-
pal, the anonymity of Bangkok Bank's trading strategies is guaranteed until Bang-
kok Bank's identity is revealed at a later stage in the dealmaking process. 
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the New York Broker cannot ascertain the credit risk associated with 
the proposed transaction. 
The New York Broker immediately endeavors to find an accept-
able counterparty by communicating (again, either by telephone or an 
electronic messaging system) with potentially interested banks. While 
it may take the New York Broker several hours to find an agreeable 
bank, such a lengthy delay would be unusual. In general, brokered 
transactions take several seconds or a few minutes to conclude. Thus, 
after speaking with three or four banks, the New York Broker tele-
phones Citibank which indicates that it agrees to buy 5 billion yen at 
101 yen per dollar. In response, the New York Broker utters the word 
commonly used in the global currency bazaar-"yours"-and repeats 
the key terms of the deal, saying "5 billion yen at 101." Upon the 
utterance of "yours," Citibank agrees to enter into a spot foreign 
exchange contract to buy 5 billion yen for $49.5 million. However, it 
still does not know who its counterparty is and, therefore, cannot 
assess the credit risk associated with the contract. 
Immediately after obtaining Citibank as a counterparty, the 
New York Broker notifies the Thai Broker, who then relays to Bang-
kok Bank the fact that a counterparty has been found. Here too, the 
New York Broker acts as an agent for a partially disclosed principal 
and- does not reveal Citibank's identity to the Thai Broker.37 The 
Thai Broker repeats the terms of the transaction to Bangkok Bank. 
Bangkok Bank replies with the commonly used word-"mine"-to 
indicate its agreement to enter into a foreign exchange contract with 
the unknown counterparty. Bangkok Bank understands it has agreed 
to the sale of 5 billion yen against $49.5 million. Because Bangkok 
Bank does not yet know Citibank is its counterparty, it cannot ascer-
tain the credit risk of the proposed deal. 
The Thai Broker then calls the New York Broker to confirm the 
transaction, which does so with Citibank. 38 At this juncture, a spot 
37. The distinctions among a "disclosed," "partially disclosed," and "undis-
closed" principal are as follows: 
(1) If, at the time of a transaction conducted by an agent, the other 
party thereto has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the 
principal's identity, the principal is a disclosed principal. 
(2) If the other party has notice that the agent is or may be acting for a 
principal but has no notice of the principal's identity, the principal for 
whom the agent is acting is a partially disclosed principal. 
(3) If the other party has no notice that the agent is acting for a princi· 
pal, the one for whom he acts is an undisclosed principal. 
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 8, at § 4 (emphasis supplied). 
38. Ultimately, in many instances written confirmations of the terms of the 
spot deal are exchanged between the banks and their brokers, or between the 
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foreign exchange contract is formed. 39 Furthermore, at this juncture, 
Citibank must find out the identity of its counterparty in order to 
record properly the transaction on Citibank's books and records and 
obtain settlement instructions for the delivery of $49.5 million on the 
value date.40 Bangkok Bank has the same need. Accordingly, the 
Thai and New York Brokers exchange the names of their principals 
and inform the respective principals of their counterparties. It is at 
this point that credit risk appraisal becomes possible. 
When the New York Broker tells its principal that its 
counterparty ·is Bangkok Bank, Citibank replies "fine." However, 
when the Thai Broker informs Bangkok Bank of the identity of the 
counterparty, Bangkok Bank balks. It replies with language some-
times heard in the global currency bazaar: "I can't do Citibank. I 
want a switch. Get me a new name." In other words, Bangkok Bank 
demands (1) to be released from the contract with Citibank and (2) a 
new counterparty to which to sell 5 billion yen at 101 yen per dollar. 
Bangkok Bank's demand for a switch of counterparties may arise for 
several reasons, one of which is its credit appraisal of Citibank.41 It 
forecasts that Citibank may be unable or unwilling to deliver 5 bil-
lion yen on the value date. Second, Bangkok Bank may have exhaust-
ed its trading limit for Citibank.42 Finally, Bangkok Bank may fear 
that completing the trade with Citibank would entail an unaccept-
ably high level of Herstatt risk.43 
banks directly. 
39. For a discussion considering the formation of spot foreign exchange con-
tracts, see infra note 50. 
40. Settlement instructions indicate the name of the counterparty's bank and 
the counterparty's bank account. The $49.5 million is delivered to the appropriate 
bank and account on the value date. 
41. For a discussion of Herstatt risk, see supra note 7. 
42. Like most banks, Bangkok Bank may have established for itself quanti-
tative limits on the extent to which it will trade with particular banks. Such pre-
established built-in trading limits are a credit risk management device. If not 
exceeded, the limits prevent undue exposure to a particular counterparty. Bangkok 
Bank's limit for Citibank already may be exhausted, or may be too small for a 5 
billion yen transaction. 
43. For a further discussion of Herstatt risk, see supra note 7. Bangkok 
Bank will be open for business before Citibank because of the time in Bangkok 
relative to New York. Accordingly, it will deliver 5 billion yen to the designated 
account of Citibank before Citibank delivers $49.5 million to Bangkok Bank's desig-
nated account. During the time gap between the yen and dollar deliveries, Bang-
kok Bank is exposed to Herstatt risk. If Citibank becomes insolvent or is closed by 
regulatory authorities before it is able to pay $49.5 million to Bangkok Bank, then 
Bangkok Bank will become a general unsecured creditor of Citibank. It is likely to 
receive the proverbial "ten cents on the dollar," or just $5 million. 
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Because of fierce competition among foreign exchange brokers 
for the business of dealing banks; the Thai Broker attempts to ar-
range a switch of counterparties for Bangkok Bank.44 Bangkok Bank 
notifies the New York Broker, which in turn notifies Citibank, that 
Bangkok Bank no longer wishes to perform the contract and will 
endeavor to find a new and acceptable counterparty. Bangkok Bank 
hopes that Fuji Bank eventually will agree to (1) buy 5 billion yen at 
101 yen per dollar and (2) sell the yen to Citibank at the same rate. 
Bangkok Bank accepts Fuji Bank as its counterparty.45 
B. Reactions to the Attempt 
Citibank may have one of three reactions to the switch of 
counterparties. First, it may assent to it and thus buy the yen from 
Fuji Bank in lieu of Bangkok Bank. This response is likely, if two 
conditions are satisfied: Fuji Bank represents an acceptable credit 
risk for Citibank; and the prevailing spot market rate remains at 101 
yen per dollar between the time the transaction was initially pro-
posed and the time Fuji Bank was proposed as a new counterparty. 
However, if the acceptability condition is not satisfied, then a 
second reaction is likely. Citibank may insist that it has a contract 
with Bangkok Bank and refuse .to agree to its removal from the deal. 
44. Because the identities of the principals are known instantly in a direct 
dealing arrangement, the need to switch counterparties does not arise therein. 
Even in a brokered transaction, it would appear that one alternative to 
switching would be for each bank principal to give its broker a list of 
counterparties with which the bank will not trade. However, this alternative raises 
two difficulties. First, it would be administratively cumbersome because the 
counterparties on each bank's list would change as trading limits and credit risk 
appraisals change. Every day, and perhaps several times a day, the names on the 
list might have to be changed. 
Second, in some past instances where a bank has given a list of unaccept-
able counterparties to a foreign exchange broker, that broker has shared the list 
with other brokers and banks. The other brokers and banks sometimes accept the 
credit risk appraisal of the bank that prepared the list instead of doing their own 
analysis. The banks that appear on the shared list then find it difficult to trade at 
all. Intimately, the brokers and banks who make decisions based on the list may 
be subject to antitrust liability for acting in a concerted way in refusing to deal 
with banks on the list. See, e.g., Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); RICHARD 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 153-56 (1976) (discussing refusal to deal cases); RESTATE-
MENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw (regarding extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust laws). · 
45. Fuji Bank is sometimes referred to as the "clearing bank" by market par-
ticipants. See Letter from Lewis W. (Woody) Teel, Chairman, Foreign Exchange 
Committee, to foreign exchange market participants (Sept. 23, 1993) [hereinafter, 
Teel Letter], in ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 25, at 23. 
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To be sure, it may be short-sighted for Citibank to attempt to disal-
low the switch. In a subsequent transaction it may be in Bangkok 
Bank's position and seek to avoid a bad credit risk. More generally, 
commercial parties may be repeat players with long-standing rela-
tionships. They may choose alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms instead of litigation to preserve such relationships. Indeed, 
heretofore the players in the global currency bazaar have preferred 
direct negotiated settlements to lawsuits. In any event, insisting on 
performance of the original contract through litigation is an available 
strategy. Of course, this response would be problematical for the New 
York Broker. More seriously, litigation brought by Citibank to compel 
Bangkok Bank to honor the initial contract would be fraught with 
problems inherent in bringing suit in a foreign country, or enforcing 
a U.S. judgment in a foreign country, such as choice of law, choice of 
forum, and the like. 
If the rate condition is not satisfied, then a third reaction is 
possible. Because of the short-term volatility of exchange rates, the 
dollar-yen spot rate may have changed from 101-100 to 100-99 yen 
per dollar. At a bid rate of 100 instead of 101 yen per dollar, Citibank 
must pay $50 million instead of $49.5 million for 5 billion yen.46 
Thus, Citibank may "stuff' the New York Broker with the transaction 
by insisting that the New York Broker persuade Fuji Bank (or some 
other counterparty) to deal with Citibank at the old, off-market rate 
of 101 yen per dollar. This response is problematical for the New 
·York Broker because it may be difficult to persuade Fuji Bank to do 
so (or find another counterparty willing to do so). To induce a bank to 
enter into a spot contract at an off-market rate, it may be necessary 
for the New York Broker to bribe a trader at the bank. Such bribes, 
known as "points," may take the form of cash, cars, or cocaine and 
obviously raise ethical and legal problems-yet, they are not uncom-
mon in the global currency bazaar.47 
46. The exact figures are $49,019,607.84 and $49,504,950.50, respectively. 
47. Points have attracted the attention of govemment regulators such as the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Acting through the New York Foreign Ex-
change Committee, it has issued several warnings to foreign exchange market par-
ticipants against the use of points. THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITI'EE, ANNuAL 
REPORT 5-6 {1991); THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITTEE, ANNuAL REPORT 28 {1990) 
[hereinafter, ANNuAL REPORT 1990]; FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, POLI-
CY STATEMENT ON THE USE OF "POINTS" IN SE'ITLING FOREIGN ExCHANGE CON-
TRACTS {Aug. 1, 1980), in ANNuAL REPORT 28 {1990); THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
COMMITTEE, ANNuAL REPORT 4-6, 15-17, 23 {1989), [hereinafter, ANNuAL REPORT 
1989]; Margaret L. Greene, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Remarks on the 
Practice of Points in the Brokered Foreign Exchange Market, Address· at the Forex 
USA, Inc. Senior Dealers' Seminar {Nov. 9-11, 1989), in ANNuAL REPORT 1989, 
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Which response from Citibank is appropriate depends on the 
legal foundation for the attempted switch of counterparties. If by 
means of a switch the Bangkok Bank-Citibank contract is rescinded 
and a new Bangkok Bank-Fuji Bank contract is formed, then assent-
ing to the substitution of counterparties is appropriate.48 If there is 
no legal basis for a switch, then Citibank is entitled to reject the 
purported substitution of counterparties and insist on performance of 
the original contract, or to stuff the Thai Broker with the terms of 
the original transaction~ 49 Uncertainty about the legal foundation for 
switches creates uncertainty about which response is appropriate. In 
turn, the ability of Bangkok Bank and Citibank to regulate their 
credit risk exposure through switches is uncertain. 
C. Regulatory Concerns About Switches 
Government regulators, most notably the Federal Reserve, have 
expressed concern about the practice of switches on three grounds.50 
supra, at 18-22; THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITI'EE, ANNuAL REPORT 6-8, 22-36 
(1988) [hereinafter, ANNuAL REPORT 1988]. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the payment of points continues. Moreover, the Bank of England ex-
pressly authorizes such payment among participants ·in London so long as ade-
quate disclosures are made. BANK OF ENGLAND, THE LoNDON CODE OF CONDUCT 
CJICJI 88-89 (May 1992); ANNuAL REPORT 1989, supra, at 6. 
48. Of course, without Citibank's assent, Bangkok Bank remains liable for 
Citibank's performance. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. 
49. If switches lack a well-founded legal basis, then Citibank knows it is 
impossible to obtain a new counterparty without the consent of the initial 
counterparty (here, Bangkok Bank) after the words "yours" or "mine" are uttered. 
Instead of switching counterparties, one means of managing credit risk exposure 
would be to defer the moment of contract formation. Accordingly, Citibank could 
postpone the moment of contract formation by attempting to defer the utterance of 
these terms until after it undertakes a credit risk appraisal of prospective 
counterparties. 
This proposed solution poses two problems. First, it presumes Citibank 
knows or can ascertain the identity of the prospective counterparties. As indicated 
above, those counterparties may prefer to act as partially disclosed principals for 
as long as possible. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. Second, defer-
ring contract formation is undesirable because it means fewer wealth-generating 
brokered foreign exchange transactions are consummated. 
50. Acting through the Foreign Exchange Committee, the Federal Reserve 
has caused a number of pronouncements about switches to be issued. See Teel 
Letter, supra note 45, at 23. 
Contract formation is a fourth concern raised by the Federal Reserve. At 
various meetings of the Foreign Exchange Committee and its subcommittees, the 
Federal Reserve has asked whether in a case like the one illustrated above, a 
contract exists between the two initial bank principals. 
On this point the Federal Reserve creates unnecessary confusion. Regard-
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First, finding a substitute counterparty like Fuji Bank with which to 
consummate a new foreign exchange contract may take several 
hours. The Federal Reserve does not like a bank in the position of 
Bangkok Bank or Citibank to have an "open" foreign exchange posi-
tion for an extended period of time. This position generates uncer-
tainty as to the precise credit risk to which a bank is exposed and, in 
turn, is a catalyst for disputes if the bank fails or is closed while the 
position remains open.51 Second, because of exchange rate volatility, 
less of the applicable legal regime, there should be little doubt that a contract is 
formed between Bangkok Bank and Citibank. Under Article 2, intent to be bound 
is manifested on both sides. See U.C.C. § 2-204. Article 2 dispenses with the com-
mon law requirement of showing the existence of an offer, acceptance, and con-
sideration. The same result would be obtained under the proposed revision to Arti-
cle 2. See U.C.C. Article 2 (Revised Draft, August 1994), at § 2-204 [hereinafter, 
August 1994 Draft]. 
Under the contract formation articles contained in part II of the Conven-
tion for the Internatinal Sale of Goods (C.I.S.G.), a contract is formed. Under Arti-
cle 14(1), there is a sufficiently defmite offer from Bangkok Bank through the Thai 
and New York brokers to Citibank that indicates Bangkok Bank's intention to be 
bound. Under Article 15(1), the offer is effective as soon as the New York Broker 
conveys it to Citibank. Under Article 18(1), Citibank's assent, conveyed to Bangkok 
Bank through the New York and Thai Brokers, constitutes an acceptance of the 
offer. Under Article 18(2), the acceptance is effective as soon as it reaches Bang-
kok Bank. Under Article 16(1), the attempted switch occurs after Citibank dis-
patches its acceptance and, therefore, the offer is not effectively revoked. See 
.AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, THE 
CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GoODS 32-33, 80-81 (Daniel Barstow 
Magraw & Reed R. Kathrein, eds., 1987) [hereinafter, THE CONVENTION]. 
Similarly, under the common law, there is an offer (by Bangkok Bank 
through the Thai and New York Brokers to Citibank), acceptance (by Citibank 
through the New York and Thai Brokers to Bangkok Bank), and consideration 
($49.5 million for 5 billion yen). The acceptance is effective upon dispatch by 
Citibank, which occurs before the attempted switch. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 24, 33, 35, 36, 42, 50, 52, 56, 58, 63-64, 71, 75, 79 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter, RESTATEMENT]. 
Perhaps an interesting argument could be made that a foreign exchange 
contract subject to a switch involves an illusory promise and is, therefore, unen-
forceable. It could be said that each side is saying to the other "I will deliver the 
required currency on the value date if I can." The stipulation refers to credit risk 
concerns and puts ·the power to determine whether to perform in the promisor. See 
id. at § 77. Arguably, the promise is rendered less illusory if it is subject to an 
obligation of good faith. 
51. Extending the hypothetical Bangkok Bank-Citibank deal illustrates the 
point. During the period when the Thai Broker is looking on behalf of Bangkok 
Bank for a substitute counterparty for Citibank, both Bangkok Bank and Citibank 
have open positions - each has tentatively recorded a dollar-yen foreign exchange 
trade with a price (exchange rate) and quantity, but no counterparty. Suppose the 
period lasts for several hours and Citibank goes bankrupt or is closed by ~e ap-
. propriate federal banking regulator during this period. (Because Citibank is a na-
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a switched transaction may be executed atan off-market rate.52 The 
longer it takes to find a new counterparty, the more likely the ex-
change rate will change from the rate that had been agreed to in the 
initial contract that is the subject of the switch. Therefore, it will be 
difficult to consummate a new contract at the rate that had been 
established for the initial contract.53 Third, record-keeping associat-
ed with switches may be poor. Consequently, switches may be ar-
ranged by an individual foreign exchange trader without the knowl-
edge of her senior management at the trader's bank.54 In effect, the 
trader may circumvent trading controls, like limits, or even defraud 
her own bank. 
This Federal Reserve approach is unfortunate. It circumscribes 
the potential for trade usages to serve as a self-regulatory device. It 
may chill future innovations in trade usages. The five-minute right of 
rescission usage proposed below is designed to address the Federal 
Reserve's concerns.55 
tionally-chartered bank, ·the Office of the Comptroller would be the appropriate 
authority. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 1813(q)(1) (1994). Is the Bangkok Bank-Citibank 
deal enforceable, or was it rescinded by virtue of the switch? 
The position taken on this issue might depend on the profitability of the 
deal. Suppose the deal is favorable to Citibank. Then, the receiver for Citibank 
(which would be the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii)(1994)) would claim an enforceable contract exists with Bangkok 
Bank. Bangkok Bank might contest this claim. 
52. For example, the Bangkok Bank-Fuji Bank transaction may be executed 
at a rate other than 101 yen per dollar, which is the prevailing market rate. 
53. See text accompanying infra notes 46-47. 
54. These concerns are evinced in the Federal Reserve's pronouncements 
(made through the Foreign Exchange Committee) about switches: 
In recent [Foreign Exchange] Committee discussions . . . members have 
concluded that, while name substitution may enhance the efficiency of the 
brokered foreign exchange market, such transactions can entail risks that 
may undermine the sound operation of the foreign exchange market. Ex-
change rates continue to move between the time that a counterparty is 
rejected and the time that an acceptable clearing institution [i.e., substi-
tute counterparty] is identified. As a result, switched transactions will 
usually be executed at rates not currently being quoted in the market 
and, therefore, must be treated with the same care as any off-market rate 
transaction. While in some cases the period between counterparty rejection 
and identification of an acceptable clearing institution may be only a few 
minutes, in other cases this period may extend to several hours. In addi-
tion, because name substitutions as currently arranged are an accommoda-
tion between traders and brokers and are not normally reflected as 
switches in the records of the institutions involved, they are sometimes 
accomplished without the knowledge or approval of management. 
Teel Letter, supra note 45, at 23. 
55. See infra IV.C. 
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D. Assumptions About Governing Law 
' Part of the reason for uncertainty about the legal foundation for 
switches is doubt about the legal regime that governs the perfor-
mance of foreign exchange contract obligations. For two reasons, it is 
tempting to ignore the issue of governing law. First, the thesis of this 
article concerns self-regulation in a global market through reinvigo-
rated usages of trade. Electronic commerce creates global markets 
which, by definition, transcend parochial jurisdictional boundaries. If 
trade usage is the governing "law," then choice of law questions are 
irrelevant. 
There is no doubt that trade usages are a close substitute for 
cross-border law in a world in which there are few instances of multi-
jurisdictional law. Indeed, this fact is perhaps the most persuasive 
reason for relying on trade usages in our increasingly global economy. 
Presently, trade usages may be the best means for achieving harmo-
nization of rules. However, a "meta-law" is needed to provide a source 
of authority for trade usages, i.e., to condone their very use as a self-
regulatory device. It is the meta-law situated behind and transcend-
ing trade usages that provides them with an irreducible minimum 
foundation. 
Second, if Article 1 of the U.C.C. is that meta-law, then why not 
at least ignore other Articles of the U.C.C.? After all, the thesis con-
cerns Section 1-205, hence the outcome of the current controversy 
about whether Article 2 or 4A governs a foreign exchange transaction 
should be hnmaterial. 56 To this suggestion the response must be 
that two severe repercussions follow from ignoring the problem of 
what law governs a global electronic market. First, the resolution of 
specific legal issues may differ depending on the applicable law. The 
potential for different outcomes creates uncertainty for market par-
ticipants. Second, where the resolutions to an issue are the same 
regardless of the law applied, courts may be complacent and neglect 
to establish clearly the rationale for their choice of law. This compla-
cency will generate sloppy commercial law jurisprudence that haunts 
future litigants and judges involved in cases where different results 
would be obtained depending on the applicable law. The lack of clear 
precedent on choice of law will cause uncertainty in such cases. 
56. See Bhala, supra note 5; Stephen C. Veltri, Should Foreign Exchange Be 
"Foreignn to Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 27 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 
343 (1994); Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Chairman, American Bar Associa· 
tion Subcommittee on Payments, to Members of the Subcommittee, and attached 
proposal (Oct. 4, 1994) (on file with author). 
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Thus, the problem of governing law must be addressed in some 
manner. A threshold choice of law question in the case study is 
whether U.S. or Thai law governs. It is assumed that U.S. law gov-
erns simply because analyzing the implication of the alternative is 
beyond the scope of this article. Yet, this assumption hardly ends the 
matter. Insofar as foreign exchange is a "good" as that term is de-
fined in Section 2-105(1) of the U.C.C., Article 2 applies. If Article 2 
is inapplicable, then Article 4A may govern the performance obliga-
tions and, in addition, the common law of contract may apply. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the scope of application of Article 
2 with respect to foreign exchange transactions should be determined 
on pragmatic grounds. 57 For present purposes, I assume that Article 
2 applies to the Bangkok Bank-Citibank dollar-yen transaction and 
attempted switch. In the short term, this assumption is realistic for 
two reasons. First, the players in the global currency bazaar tend to 
choose well-developed bodies of law-namely, New York or English 
law-to govern their transactions.58 Second, already U.S. courts 
have applied Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions.59 Future ap-
plications at least by analogy may be expected because courts are 
wont to apply familiar law in unfamiliar contexts. 
In the long term, three factors are likely to affect the applicabili-
ty of Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions. First, courts may find 
that such application has undesirable consequences. One example 
concerns a seller's right of reclamation under Section 2-702(2).60 Ar-
guably, this right conflicts with the receiver finality rule set forth in 
Section 4A-405(c).61 In addition, reclamation could allow a creditor 
of a failed bank to circumvent a foreign insolvency proceeding. 62 
57. Bhala, supra note 5, at 4-5, 22-24. 
58. The choice of law clause in the International Foreign Exchange Master 
Agreement, a master standard-form contract recently developed by the Foreign 
Exchange Committee for spot and forward contracts, is an example. See Interna-
tional Foreign Exchange Master Agreement, Section 9.1 in THE FOREIGN ExCHANGE 
COMMITI'EE, ANNuAL REPORT 49 (1993). A forward contract is one whose value 
date is longer than T 2. See supra note 23. 
59. See, e.g., In re Koreag, Controle Et Revision S.A. v. Refco FIX Associates, 
Inc., 961 F.2d 341, 355-58 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 188 (1992). 
60. This Section allows a seller to reclaim goods upon demand within ten 
days after the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while 
insolvent. 
61. See Bhala, supra note 5, at 18, n. 74. Receiver finality means that a 
credit· of funds to the bank account of the beneficiary of a funds transfer is fmal 
and irrevocable. Any credit contingent on the beneficiary's bank receiving settle-
ment from the bank which sent it a payment order is unenforceable. 
62. See Koreag, 961 F.2d at 355-58. In Koreag, a failed bank, Middle .East 
Bank Corporation (Mebco) was the subject of a Swiss insolvency proceeding. One of 
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Finally, reclamation could undermine regulatory efforts to develop 
systems for netting;a foreign currency delivery obligations between 
its creditors was Refco, with which Mebco had entered into foreign exchange con-
tracts. The court recognized Refco's Section 2-702(2) right to reclaim currency deliv-
ered to Mebco. Hence, Refco did not have to obtain recovery through a foreign 
insolvency proceeding. ld. 
In general, because the seller has ten days to recover foreign currency 
delivered to an insolvent buyer, the seller in effect is a preferred creditor for that 
period. By reclaiming the currency within the designated period, the seller need 
not make a claim through the insolvency proceeding to which the insolvent buyer 
is subject. 
However, this potentially adverse consequence should not be overstated. 
Section 2-702(2) applies only where the delivery satisfied two conditions: it is made 
(1) on credit and (2) to a buyer who is insolvent. The presumption is that if these 
conditions are satisfied, the buyer has fraudulently misrepresented its financial 
condition to the seller. See Section 2-702 cmt. 2. 
Arguably, neither of these conditions is satisfied, and the court in Koreag 
misapplied the law. First, it is difficult to see why a spot foreign exchange trans-
action involves an extension of credit. In the transaction, one bank's delivery of 
currency is not made on credit but rather in consideration of a reciprocal delivery 
on the same value date. Second, it is difficult to imagine an onslaught of cases 
involving deliveries of foreign currencies to insolvent bank buyers. In the global 
currency bazaar, banks generally are (or should be ) well aware of the credit 
standing of other banks and, therefore, are unlikely to deliver currencies to failed 
banks. 
63. "Netting" refers to "an agreed offsetting of positions or obligations by 
trading partners or participants. The netting reduces a large number of individual 
positions or obligations to a smaller number of obligations or positions." COMMIT-
TEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE 
GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT SYS-
TEMS IN THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 541 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter, PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS]. See also Ebo A Coleman, Netting A Red Herring, in 9 BUTTERWORTHS 
J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 391 (1994); Stephen J. Phillips and Brian W.J. 
Rutherford, Netting- The Shape of Things to Come, in 9 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L 
BANKING & FIN. L. 174 (1994). 
In a bilateral netting system for foreign exchange obligations, delivery 
obligations for the same currency denominations and value dates are netted be-
tween two trading parties where the parties have entered into two or more foreign 
exchange contracts. Presently, FXNET, "a limited partnership formed under Eng-
lish law and owned by the UK subsidiaries of twelve major banks," is the leading 
system for the bilateral netting of currency obligations arising from spot and for-
ward foreign exchange contracts. 
In a multilateral netting scheme, three or more foreign exchange traders 
net their delivery obligations for the same currency types and value dates. This 
netting is accomplished through parties known as settling participants which settle 
"(typically by means of a single payment or receipt) the multilateral net settlement 
position which results from transfers made and received by it, for its own account 
and on behalf of its customers or non-settling participants for which it is acting." 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra, at 540. Presently, there is no scheme for netting curren-
cy obligations multilaterally. However, a group of international banks are develop-
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or among foreign exchange traders.64 
ing the Exchange Clearing House Organization (ECHO) to net spot and forward 
foreign exchange contracts on a multilateral basis through a central clearing house 
located in London. PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra, at 498. In addition, Multinet, devel-
oped by eight U.S. and Canadian commercial and investment banks, is a bilateral 
netting facility that should be operational in early 1995. Multinet is designed to 
accommodate multilateral netting. PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra, at 497. See Steven 
Lipin, Eight Banks form Clearinghouse to Cut Cost of Foreign-Exchange Transac-
tions, WAll. ST. J., Aug. 1, 1994, at A2; Laurie Morse, Group plans clearing house 
for forex trades, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 1994, at 17. The Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System (CHIPS), owned and operated by the New York Clearing House 
Association, is a multilateral netting system for dollar payments which handles a 
large number of payment instructions arising from foreign exchange transactions. 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra, at 449-50. 
Bilateral and multilateral netting schemes potentially reduce the amounts 
of foreign currency that each party needs to deliver to the other, and the number 
of deliveries that must be made. Invariably, such deliveries are made by wire 
transfer. See Bhala, supra note 18, at 373-75." Bilateral netting can result in a 50 
percent reduction in the value and volume of wire transfers, and multilateral net-
ting can result in a reduction of 80 percent, from what would be needed for gross 
settlement. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SE'ITLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP , OF TEN 
COUNTRIES, '!I'll 2.4 at 11, 2.12 at 13 (Nov. 1990). As a result of such reductions, 
systemic risk - the risk that a failure by one party to settle its payment obli-
gations will lead to financial difficulties for and (possibly) failures of other parties 
that expected settlement from the failed party, and ultimately (perhaps) a market 
meltdown - is lowered. 
64. As indicated above, the right of reclamation allows the seller of a foreign 
currency to reclaim that currency for ten days after the date the currency was 
delivered to the insolvent buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2). Reclamation would require 
unwinding a net payment made by the seller to the buyer and reinstating the 
gross payment obligations, thereby undermining the netting system. However, this 
unwind - while perhaps administratively complex -is not inconceivable. U.C.C. 
Section 4A-405(e) condones an unwind of payment obligations made by wire trans-
fer pursuant to a multilateral netting scheme (such as CHIPS) whose loss-sharing 
arrangement has failed to produce a final settlement. Id. § 4A-405. In other words, 
the law already specifies an important exception to the receiver finality rule of 
Section 4A-405(c) for multilateral netting systems. 
More seriously, there is a practical distinction between a netting system, 
on the one hand, and a real-time gross settlement system (in which no netting 
occurs and payment orders are issued, received, and accepted or rejected in real 
time), on the other hand, with respect to the time at which receiver finality is 
achieved. In many instances, receiver finality in a funds transfer through a real-
time, gross settlement system is achieved as soon as a credit is entered by the 
beneficiary's bank to the account of the beneficiary (which is maintained at the 
beneficiary's bank). See id. § 4A-404(a) (explaining that a beneficiary's bank is obli-
gated to pay the beneficiary when the bank accepts a payment order), 4A-209(b) 
(defining when a beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order). In contrast, receiver 
fmality cannot be guaranteed in a multilateral net settlement system until net net 
settlement payments (i.e., payments from net net debtors to net net creditors) are 
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Another example concerns the Section 2-201 statute of frauds. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the statute of frauds does not serve the 
needs of the players in the global currency bazaar because it calls 
into question the enforceability of their agreements. 55 The players in 
the global currency bazaar do not necessarily write down their expec-
tations, as the above case study illustrates. This fact makes the argu-
ment for self-regulation through trade usages even more compelling. 
In any event, Section 2-201 should be modified or deleted through the 
current Article 2 revision process. While the August 1994 revised 
draft of Article 2 wisely abolishes the statute of frauds, it could be 
reinstated as either a hub or spoke provision at the insistence of 
various interest groups such as the computer software industry.68 To 
eschew the issue of enforceability herein, it is assumed that a final 
decision is made to exclude the statute of frauds and that state legis-
latures enact Article 2 accordingly. 
Second, the outcome of the Article 2 revision process is uncer-
tain. As proposed in August 1994, the revisions to Article 2 have no 
effect on the argument in this article. No substantive changes have 
been suggested to the two principal provisions of Article 2 discussed 
below, Sections 2-21067 and 2-609.68 However, a proposal has been 
offered regarding Section 2-102(a)(23) to expressly exclude foreign 
exchange from the definition of a "good." If this proposal were adopt-
ed, then the common law of contract69-assuming the the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(C.I.S.G.)70 were inapplicable-would govern foreign exchange trans-
made through that system. Such payments occur at the end of the funds transfer 
business day. Only after such settlement occurs is it clear that the unwind scenar-
io contemplated by Section 4A-405(e) will not occur. Id. § 4A-405. Thus, the Fed-
eral Reserve's concern that reclamation will undermine the development of netting 
systems must be tempered by the fact that receiver finality on such systems oc-
curs in a qualified and deferred manner. 
65. See Bhala, supra note 5, at 4-5, 24-52. 
66. August 1994 Draft, supra note 50; telephone conversation with Professor 
David· Frisch, American Bar Association Advisor to the U.C.C. Article 2 (Sales) 
Drafting Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, Oct. 20; 1994. 
67. See infra IVA 
68. See infra IV.B. Note that the American Bar Association Article 1 Task 
Force has proposed moving Section 2-208 (concerning course of performance) into 
Section 1-205 which, if done, would necessitate conforming amendments to Section 
1-205. 
69. By "common law" it is meant the law encapsulated in the RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 50. 
70. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), opened for signature April 11, 1980, 
reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-43 (1983), 19 I.L.M. 
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actions. 71 Of course, some courts still might look to Article 2 by 
analogy. 
Third, regardless of the outcome of the Article 2 revision process, 
courts might apply the C.I.S.G.-which entered into force on January 
1, 1988---to foreign exchange transactions. 72 • The application of the 
668-99 (1980); THE CONVENTION, supra note 50, at 28-61. The U.S. signed the 
C.I.S.G. on Aug. 31, 1981, the Senate gave its advice and consent on Oct. 9, 1986, 
and the U.S. deposited the instrument of ratification with the United Nations Sec-
retariat on Dec. 11, 1986. THE CONVENTION, supra note 50, at 4, 67. Because the 
C.I.S.G. is self-executing, no implementing legislation was necessary. Currently, 
there are ·34 parties to the C.I.S.G. See Fax from United Nations Treaty Section, 
New York, to author, regarding United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, June 14, 1994 (on file with author) [hereinafter, Unit-
ed Nations Fax]. 
Note that the C.I.S.G. does not contain a statute of frauds. To the con-
trary, it ensures the enforceability of oral contracts. See C.I.S.G. Article 11; THE 
CONVENTION, supra note 50, at 31. Note also that contracting states with a statute 
of frauds are permitted to take a reservation to Article 11, but the U.S. has not 
taken such a reservation. See C.I.S.G. Articles 12, 96; THE CONVENTION, supra 
note 50, at 31, 57. 
71. Because of the similarity of the common law and Article 2 on the key 
issues discussed herein, application of the common law would have little effect on 
the argument. See infra notes 77, 95 (comparing Section 1-205 and Restatement 
Sections 219-222), 176-78 and accompanying text (comparing Section 2-210 and 
RESTATEMENT Section 317-320), 192 (comparing Section 2-609 and RESTATEMENT 
Section 251). 
The implications of applying the C.I.S.G. to the Bangkok Bank-Citibank 
transaction and attempted switch are treated briefly below. See infra notes 77, 95 
(comparing Section 1-205 and C.I.S.G. Article 9), 174-76 and accompanying text 
(comparing Section 2-210 and the C.I.S.G.), 192 (comparing Section 2-609 and 
C.I.S.G. Article 71(1)), 203-204 (discussing international commercial law reform). 
For general comparisons between the U.C.C. and C.I.S.G., see U.N. CONVENTION 
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GoODS (Grant R. Ackerman, ed., 
1993); ALBERT H. KRITLER, GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GoODS 
(1989); Isaak I. Dore & James E. DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantiue 
Prouisions of the UNCITRAL Conuention on the International Sale of Goods and 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 23· HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 (1982); Paul Lansing & 
Nancy R. Hauserman, A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code to 
UNCITRAL's Conuention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 6 N.C. 
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 63 (1981; Note, Unification and Certainty: The United 
Nations Conuention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 97 HARV. L. 
REv. 1984 (1984). 
72. Because Thailand has not joined the C.I.S.G., and because of the U.S. 
reservation to Article 1(1)(b), the C.I.S.G. cannot apply to the case study. See Unit-
ed Nations Fax, supra note 70. While Article 1(1)(b) allows for the application of 
the C.I.S.G. when only one of the involved countries has joined if relevant choice 
of law rules would dictate such application, the U.S. has taken a reservation to 
this provision pursuant to Article 95. See THE CONVENTION, supra note 50, at 71. 
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C.I.S.G. in the foreign exchange context has not yet been tested.73 It 
is clear that the C.I.S.G. applies to a contract for the sale of goods 
between parties located in different countries if the countries have 
ratified or acceded to the C.I.S.G.74 But, to apply the C.I.S.G., a 
court must determine that foreign exchange is a "good" under Article 
1(1),75 and that the C.I.S.G. governs notwithstanding the statement 
in Article 2(d) that it is inapplicable to sales of money. The outcome 
of the debate on this issue in the context of Article 2 could influence 
the outcome in the C.I.S.G. context. A vexing choice of law problem 
could arise if foreign exchange is considered a "good" under both 
laws.76 
73. Indeed, precious few cases in U.S. courts have considered applying the 
C.I.S.G. See Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corporation v. American 
Business Center, Inc., 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to choose between 
the application of Texas law and the C.I.S.G.); Interag Co. Ltd. v. Stafford Phase 
Corp., No. 89-4950, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6134 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1990), affd 983 
F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing Section 2-714(2) and C.I.S.G. Article 50); 
Filanto v. Chilewich, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5011, 5028-31 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 14, 1992) 
(noting that the C.I.S.G. rejects the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and 
Section 2-207, and stating that under C.I.S.G. Article 81(1), contracts and arbitra-
tion clauses included therein are severable); Filanto v. Chilewich lnt'l Corp., 789 F. 
Supp. 1229, 1237, 1239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing the C.I.S.G. in relation to a 
disputed arbitration clause and when an offeree's assent to an offer constitutes ac-
ceptance); Orbisphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344, 1355 (Ct. lnt'l 
Trade 1989) (acknowledging the applicability of the C.I.S.G. in certain circumstanc-
es); Promaulayko v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 540 A.2d 893 (1988), reu'd., 562 A.2d 
202 (N.J. 1989) (discussing problems in international trade and the service of pro-
cess on foreign corporations). 
One solution to the problem of defining the scope of the C.I.S.G. is to 
apply the pragmatic strategy I have suggested elsewhere, i.e., to make use of the 
same test proposed for determining the scope of Article 2. See Bhala, supra note 5, 
at 4-6, 52-53. 
74. See C.I.S.G. Article 1(1)(a). 
75. The C.I.S.G. does not define the term "good." 
76. One factor in determining whether Article 2 or the C.I.S.G. would apply 
is a choice of law (if any) made by the parties. Article 6 of the C.I.S.G. allows the 
parties to choose to exclude the application of the C.I.S.G. Thus, for example, 
parties could elect not to apply the C.I.S.G. by signing the International Foreign 
Exchange Master Agreement and expressly choosing New York (or English) law as 
applicable. An interesting question is whether a court would consider the choice of 
New York law to be a trade usage in a case where the parties had not signed 
this Agreement. 
A second factor is whether the countries in which the bank principals are 
located have ratified or acceded to the C.I.S.G. This factor raises thorny questions 
about the location of bank principals which are treated in Article 10 of the 
C.I.S.G. 
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IV. THE NARROW ROLE FOR TRADE USAGES: INTERPRETIVE 
DEVICE 
Ostensibly, it is not problematic for players in the global curren-
cy bazaar to regulate their credit risk uncertainties through a prac-
tice like switches. This practice should qualify as a "usage of trade" 
under Section 1-205. Unfortunately, however, usages often are cast in 
a narrow role thereby rendering them less efficacious than first 
thought. What foreign exchange market participants require is not 
just the establishment of switches as a trade usage, but also the 
reinvigoration of the very concept of a usage. 
A. The Brooding Omnipresence 
Pervasive direct and indirect references to the term "usage of 
trade" are found in Article 2. The definition of "usage of trade" in 
Section 1-205(2) is expansive,77 and the term is used in various pro-
77. Section 1-205(2) states that: 
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regu-
larity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. 
The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is 
established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or 
similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court. 
u.c.c. § 1-205(2). 
The RESTATEMENT definition of "usage of trade" closely resembles that in 
Section 1-205(2): 
A usage of trade is a usage having such regularity of observance in a 
place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be ob-
served with respect to a particular agreement. It may include a system of 
rules regularly observed even though particular rules are changed from 
time to time. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at Section 222(1). See also id. at§ 219 (defining "usage"). 
Like Section 1-205(2), Section 222(2) of the RESTATEMENT provides that the 
existence and scope of a usage of trade are questions of fact, and if it is embodied 
in a written trade code, then its interpretation is to be determined by a court. 
Section 222(3) of the RESTATEMENT indicates that a usage of trade of which the 
parties know or have reason to know may supplement or qualify an agreement. 
The "supplement or qualify" language is repeated in Section 1-205(3). While no 
knowledge test is set forth in Section 1-205, local usages of trade are dealt with in 
Section 1-205(5). See id. at § 222, cmt. c. 
One distinction between the U.C.C. and RESTATEMENT defmition pertains to 
the term "usage." Unlike the U.C.C., the RESTATEMENT distinguishes between a 
"usage" and "usage of trade" and defines the latter as a species of the former. A 
"usage," defined in Section 219, is a generic term encompassing any "habitual or 
customary practice." See infra note 95. 
The C.I.S.G. does not contain the term "usage of trade." Rather, it distin-
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visions of Article 2.78 Moreover, the term is contained in the defini-
tion of "agreement" in Section 1-201(3), which in turn is used in sev-
eral provisions of Article 2.79 Also, the definition of "contract" in Sec-
tion 1-201(11) incorporates the term "agreement" and, therefore, 
"trade usages." Not surprisingly "contract" is used throughout Article 
2.80 Finally, Section 1-102(1) specifies that the U.C.C. should be "lib-
guishes between two types of "usages." First, Article 9(1) of the C.I.S.G. indicates 
that "[t]he parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed .... " See 
CONVENTION, supra note 50, at 31. Second, Article 9(2) provides that unless other-
wise agreed, "[t]he parties are considered ... to have impliedly made applicable to 
their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have 
known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly ob-
served by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade con-
cerned." See CONVENTION, supra note 50, at 31. 
One reason Article 9 of the C.I.S.G is less satisfactory than U.C.C. Section 
1-205 is that no definition of "usage" is provided in the C.I.S.G. A second problem 
is that it is not clear whether parties might agree to a usage by means other than 
express contractual agreement. See infra note 95. 
78. See U.C.C. §§ 2-202 (parol evidence rule), 2-316 (exclusion or modification 
of warranties), 2-504 (shipment by seller), 2-723 (1991) (proof of market price). 
79. Section 1-201(3) states: 
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their 
language or by implication from other circumstances including the course 
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this 
Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208). 
U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1993) (Emphasis supplied.) "Agreement" is used in Sections 2-
106 (definitions), 2-202 (parol evidence rule), 2-204 (formation in general), 2-209 
(modification, rescission and waiver), 2-303 (allocation of risks), 2-305 (open price 
term), 2-311 (options and cooperation respecting performance), 2-718 (liquidation or 
limitation of damages), and 2-719 (contractual modification or limitation of reme-
dy). 
80. See U.C.C. §§ 2-106, 2-107 (goods to be severed from realty), 2-201 (stat-
ute of frauds), 2-203 (seals inoperative), 2-204, 2-206 (offer and acceptance), 2-207 
(additional terms in acceptance or confirmation), 2-208 (course of performance), 2-
209, 2-210 (assignment and delegation), 2-301 (general obligations of the parties), 
2-302 (unconscionability), 2-305, 2-306 (output and requirements contracts), 2-207 
(delivery in single lot), 2-308 (place of delivery), 2-309 (time of delivery and perfor-
mance), 2-311, 2-312 (warranty of title and infringement), 2-314 (implied warran-
ties of merchantability and usage of trade), 2-321 (CIF and C&F contracts), 2-326 
(sale on approval, sale or return, and consignment sales), 2-327 (special incidents 
of sale on approval and sale or return), 2-401 (passing of title), 2-402 (rights of 
seller's creditors. against unsold goods), 2-501 (insurable interest in goods), 2-502 
(buyer's right to goods on seller's insolvency), 2-503 (seller's tender of delivery), 2-
504 (shipment by seller), 2-505 (seller's shipment under reservation), 2-509 (risk of 
loss), 2-510 (effect of breach on risk of loss), 2-512 (payment before inspection), 2-
513 (buyer's right of inspection), 2-601 (buyer's rights on improper delivery), 2-607 
(effect of acceptance), 2-609 (adequate assurance of performance), 2-610 (anticipato-
ry repudiation), 2-611 (retraction of anticipatory repudiation), 2-612 (installment 
contracts), 2-613 (casualty to identified goods), 2-615 (excuse), 2-616 (notice claim-
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erally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies." One such purpose and policy is "to permit the continued 
expansion of commercial practices through ... usage . . . of the par-
ties."81 
While "usage of trade" is a brooding omnipresence in Article 2, 
the role typically played by usages in commercial litigation is narrow-
ly confined to that of an interpretive or translation device. 82 A re-
view of recent trade usage cases indicates .that Section 1-205 usually 
is implicated when there is a dispute as to the interpretation of one 
or more of the terms of a contract. One litigant proposes to define the 
term according to a trade usage, while the other litigant opposes the 
use of the usage to interpret the contract, or disputes the existence of 
the usage.83 In such cases, the court views the trade usage as noth-
ing excuse), 2-701 (remedies for breach of unimpaired collateral contracts), 2-703 
(seller's remedies in general), 2-704 (seller's right to identify goods), 2-706 (seller's 
resale), 2-708 (seller's damages for non-acceptance or repudiation), 2-709 (action for 
the price), 2-711 (buyer's remedies in general), 2-713 (buyer's damages for non-
delivery or repudiation), 2-720 (effect of cancellation or rescission on claims for 
antecedent breach), 2-721 (remedies for fraud), 2-722 (suing third parties), and 2-
725 (1991) (statute of limitations). 
81. Id. § 1-102(2)(b). 
82. The distinction between a usage of trade serving as a translation versus 
additional device is discussed in Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to 
Commercial Dealings and the Common Law, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1192, 1195-98 
(1955). As used herein, "interpretation" is meant to capture two processes: ascer-
taining the meaning of the parties expressed in a contractual term, and giving 
legal effect to the words used. The latter process is sometimes referred to as "con-
struction" and "[t]he construction placed upon an agreement will not necessarily 
coincide with the meaning of the parties (footnote omitted)." See J. CALAMARI AND 
J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 165 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter, CALAMARI & PERILLO]. 
83. See, e.g., Ragus Co. v. City of Chicago, 628 N.E.2d 999 (lli. Ct. App. 
1993) (concerning a dispute about reference to a usage of trade to interpret the 
quantity term in a contract for the sale of rodent traps); Dravo Corp. v. ML Barge 
Operating Corp., 35 U.C.C.R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1180 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (concern-
ing a dispute about exclusivity of remedies in a contract for the sale of barges); 
Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (concerning an alleged 
guarantee of the condition of a horse in a contract of sale for the horse); Lincoln 
Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 445 F. Supp. 507, 515, 517 (D. Me. 1977) (con-
cerning a dispute about exclusion of liability for. consequential damages); Posttape 
Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1976) (concerning a 
dispute about a limitation of liability in a contract for the sale of film). 
Often Section 1-205 operates in tandem with the parol evidence rule of 
Section 2-202. Usage of trade is mentioned in the latter provision, which provides 
that where a dispute arises as to the interpretation of the terms contained in 
confirmatory memoranda or a final agreement, a commercial party may explain or 
supplement the writing with a trade usage. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kent Rentals, 
Inc., Civ. Ac. No. 83C-OC10, 1989 Del. Super. LEXIS 373, at *14 (Sup. Ct. Del., 
Sept. 20, 1989) (concerning a dispute as to the usage of trade in a contract for 
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ing more than a source of meaning in the absence of an express con-
tractual provision and finds it inconceivable that a usage could be a 
source of obligation for market participants. 84 Indeed, even distin-
guished commentators circumscribe the role of a trade usage to that 
of interpretive device.85 
B. Reasons for the Narrow Role 
1. Austinian Positivism 
Vestiges of Austinian positivism may account for the narrow 
role. This jurisprudence suggests that a trade usage cannot be 
"law."86 To be sure, the usage is habitually followed, and traders 
setting up a mobile home); Conmar Intl. Trading Corp. v. Wearever-Proctor Silex 
Corp., No. 86 Civ 8691, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5328, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 
1987) (indicating that evidence of usage of trade, if it exists, is admissible to ex-
plain or supplement terms in the written memoranda or final agreement of the 
parties); U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Semco Manufacturing, Inc., 562 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 
(8th Cir. 1977) (concerning a dispute about the term for delivery and the interpre-
tation of "as released" in a contract to furnish ductwork); and Blue Rock Indus. v. 
Raymond Inti., Inc., 325 A.2d 66, 73-76 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1974) (concerning a 
dispute about the term "truck measured" cubic yard in a contract for sand). See 
also E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 509 (1982). Because the Bangkok Bank -
Citibank contract is oral, this line of cases is irrelevant. 
84. See, e.g., Latex Glove Co. v. Gruen, 497 N.E.2d 466 (lli. App. Ct. 1986) 
(stating that a usage of trade can fill gaps in a contract but not create "a new 
obligation for [the delivery of] separate goods"). 
85. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An 
Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 515, 516, 545-46, 
580 (1981) (discussing a usage of trade only as a basis for interpreting a contrac-
tual term); Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of 
the UCC Theory, 1977 U.ILL. L.F. 811, 815 1977) (discussing the introduction of a 
usage of trade to define a term in a written agreement or establish an additional 
term); Joseph H. Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1107 (1965) (stating that the 
U.C.C. "views trade usage as a way of determining the parties' probable intent" 
and "does not consider it an independent source of obligation or authority .... "). 
Note that Chen appears to take a somewhat broader approach to trade usages 
than the aforementioned commentators. See Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and Con-
tract: The Uniform Commercial Code as Law Merchant, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 91, 111-
17 (1992) (stating that "[t]rade usage assumes three roles in contractual interpreta-
tion: (1) to define jargon, clarify ambiguities, and explain technical terms; (2) to 
add terms to the agreement; and (3) to allow commercial meanings to control con-
trary lay definitions" (footnote omitted)). See also 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW 
REVISION COMMISSION REPORT - STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 14-
15, 79-80 (1955) [hereinafter, N.Y. LAW REvisiON COMMISSION STUDY] (stating that 
Section 1-205 "is intended to provide for the introduction in evidence ... of trade 
usages, as aids in the interpretation of contracts and other transactions within the 
scope of the [Uniform Commercial] Code .... ") (emphasis supplied). 
86. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), in 
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may treat it as if it were binding on them. But, a trade usage lacks 
the imprimatur of a sovereign whose commands are backed by 
threats of punishment:87 
By many of the admirers of customary laws . . . they are 
thought to oblige legally (independently of the sovereign or 
state), because the citizens or subjects have observed or kept 
them. Agreeably to this opinion, they are not the creatures of 
the sovereign or state, although the sovereign or state may 
abolish them at pleasure. Agreeably to this opinion, they are 
positive law ... inasmuch as they are enforced by the courts 
of justice: But, not withstanding, they exist as positive law by 
the spontaneous adoption of the governed, and not by position 
or establishment on the part of political superiors. Conse-
quently, customary laws, considered as positive law, are not 
commands. And, consequently, customary laws, considered as 
positive law, are not laws or rules properly so called .... 
At its origin, a custom is a rule of conduct which the gov-
erned observe spontaneously, or not in pursuance of a law set 
by a political superior. The custom is transmuted into positive 
law, when it is adopted as such by the courts of justice, and 
when the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by 
the power of the state. But before it is adopted by the courts, 
and clothed with the legal sanction, it is merely a rule of posi-
tive morality: a rule generally observed by the citizens or 
subjects; but deriving the only force, which it can be said to 
THE GREAT LEGAL PHILoSOPHERS 336-63 (Clarence Morris, ed., 1959). For examples 
of a positivist approach to contract law, see Georges R. Delaume, Comparative 
Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 
TuL. L. REv. 575, 577-78 (1989) (noting the need for a comparative analysis of 
substantive rules of various legal systems before engaging in a choice of law pro-
cess, and questioning whether the substantive rules of lex mercatoria would offer 
viable alternatives to the legal system); Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mer-
catoria, 63 TuL. L. REv. 613 (1989) (considering whether lex mercatoria has re-
placed national laws in interpreting international contracts); John S. Ewart, What 
is the Law Merchant?, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 135, 138 (1903) (stating that commercial 
law is "nothing but a heterogeneous lot of loose undigested customs, which it is 
impossible to dignify with the name of a body of law"). For a critique of Austinian 
positivism, see J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPIDES 24-48 (1980). 
87. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 338. See also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CUR-
RENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGliT 339-40 (1993) (discussing the imperative char-
acter of Austinian doctrine); HARRIS, supra note 85, at 32 (stating that "Austin 
defines the sovereign as a person or body of persons who receives habitual obedi-
ence within a political society . . . and who renders habitual obedience to no one 
else" and that "[l]aw are defmed as the sovereign's general commands."). 
896 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 
possess, from the general disapprobation falling on those who 
transgress it.88 
At best, Austinian positivists might concede that Section 1-205 is 
a conditional command subject to the force of nullity.89 If foreign 
exchange traders want to develop a trade usage, then they must 
comply with Section 1-205, or the practice will not be a usage. How-
ever, this argument bespeaks a parsimonious approach to what law 
is, and a greater concession is required. Even in an Austinian context 
it can be argued that Section 1-205 is positive law because it is an 
enforceable command issued by a sovereign (namely, a state legisla-
ture).90 While Section 1-205 does not specifically identify usages like 
switches, this generality should not bar their recognition as positive 
law. 
The argument that usages are law pursuant to Section 1-205 is 
even stronger when H.L.A. Hart's critique of Austinian positivism is 
considered. First, formal enactment by a sovereign is not the only 
way to create law.91 Thus, a particular trade usage like switches 
need not obtain the sovereign's imprimatur to be law. Second, and 
more fundamentally, many laws are power-conferring rules that 
enable private parties to engage in certain practices and thereby 
regulate themselves:92 
88. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 342. See also H.L.A HART, THE CONCEPI' OF 
LAw 24-25 (1961) (stating that Austin's command theory requires "some persons or 
body of persons issuing general orders backed by threats which are generally 
obeyed, and it must be generally believed that these threats are likely to be im-
plemented in the event of disobedience"). 
Under the Austinian approach, it also might be argued that a usage of 
trade is not a command because it lacks generality (it is addressed only to foreign 
exchange traders, for example) as well as a sanction. See IIARRis, supra note 86, 
at 28 (noting that for Austin every command that is a law has the feature of 
generality); HART, supra, at 21 (stating that legal control involves general direc-
tions). 
89. See IIARRis, supra note 86, at 30. 
90. While Austin's command theory implies a personal sovereign (e.g., a king 
or President), in fact Austin looked to the Constitution to identify the sovereign. 
He concluded that the sovereign was the "combined members of the electors of all 
the states' governments" because the states had the power to change the Constitu-
tion. See IIARRis, supra note 86, at 33. 
91. See HART, supra note 88, at 26 (stating that "[s]urely not all laws are 
enacted nor are they the expression of someone else's desire .... "), 43-48 (arguing 
that the legal status of custom is not based on judicial enforcement of that cus-
tom). 
92. See HART, supra note 88, at 26 (stating that "[s]urely not all laws order 
people to do or not do things" and that some laws "confer powers on private indi-
viduals to make wills, contracts, or marriages .... "). See also HARRIS, supra note 
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[T]here are important classes of law where this analogy with 
orders backed by threats altogether fails, since they perform a 
quite different social function. Legal rules defining the ways 
in which valid contracts or wills or marriages are made do not 
require persons to act in certain ways whether they wish to or 
not. Such laws do not impose duties or obligations. Instead, 
they provide individuals with facilities for realizing their 
wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by 
certain specified procedures and subject to certain conditions, 
structures of rights and duties within the coercive framework 
of the law. 
The power thus conferred on individuals to mould their 
legal relations with others by contracts, wills, marriages, &c., 
is one of the great contributions of law to social life; and it is a 
feature of law obscured by representing all law as a matter of 
orders backed by threats.93 
Plainly, Section 1-205 is a power-conferring law insofar as it autho-
rizes foreign exchange traders to develop usages. In sum, then, the 
vestiges of Austinian positivism that limit trade usages to translation 
devices should be ignored. 
2. Textual Overemphasis 
Two questionable textual interpretations may underlie the nar-
row role ascribed to trade usages. First, Section 1-205(3) is prone to 
misreading.94 Courts and scholars may overemphasize the phrase 
"give particular meaning" at the expense of the words "supplement" 
and "qualify.»S5 In truth, it is not a distortion of Section 1-205 to 
86, at 30. 
93. HART, supra note 88, at 27-28. 
94. Section 1-205(3) states that "[a] course of dealing between the parties 
and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of 
which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or · 
qualify the tenns of an agreement." U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (Emphasis supplied). 
95. A distinction between the RESTATEMENT and U.C.C. definitions concerns 
the extent to which a "usage of trade" can serve as a legal rule. The RE-
STATEMENT provides that "[a]lthough rules of law are often founded on usage, us-
age is not in itself a legal rule but merely habit or practice in fact." RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 219 cmt. a. See also id. § 221 cmt. c (indicating 
that "if the rule of law is one which .overrides contrary agreement, it also over-
rides usage; but if the law merely supplies a term in the absence of contrary 
agreement, usage can have the same effect as contary agreement"). The role of a 
"usage" is constrained to an interpretive device if each party knows or has reason 
to know of the usage, and the usage may supplement or qualify an agreement. See 
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cast a trade usage in a broad role whereby it is a legal foundation for 
a practice and thereby a device for self-regulation by those engaged 
in the practice.96 To the contrary, as Professor Kastely suggests, 
there is a textual basis for a broad role: 
The Code embodies the beliefs that the reasonable practices 
and standards of the commercial community are an appro-
priate source of legal obligation and that these practices create 
id. §§ 220(1) cmt. a, 221. 
Similarly, a "usage of trade" may supplement or qualify an agreement if 
the parties know or have reason to know of the usage of trade. See id. § 222(3). 
Arguably, because a "usage of trade" is defined in terms of a "usage," the role of 
the former cannot exceed that of the latter, thus a "usage of trade" cannot serve 
as a legal rule. See supra note 77. Indeed, in illustrations 1-6 in Section 222 of 
the RESTATEMENT, a usage of trade serves as an interpretive device. While U.C.C. 
Section 1-205 repeats the "supplement or qualify" formulation, it does not suffer 
from the proscription regarding service as a legal rule. 
The treatment of usages in the C.I.S.G. is unsatisfactory in part because 
no indication is given as to whether a usage can serve as a source of legal obliga-
tion in addition to an interpretive device. See C.I.S.G. Articles 8(3), 9 in THE CON-
VENTION, supra note 50 at 32-33. In fact, Article 4(a) states that the C.I.S.G. is 
not concerned with the validity of any usage. See generally Michael B. Devine, The 
Export of Iowa Products and the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Internation-
al Sale of Goods, 39 DRAKE L. REv. 689, 695 (1990) (suggesting that the C.I.S.G. 
gives legal effect to the practices of parties). 
96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text; FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, 
at 509 ("the Code's use of the words supplement or qualify makes clear that more 
may be involved than merely interpretation of contract language, although many 
cases involve no more than that" (citation omitted)); JAMES J. WHITE AND RoBERT 
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 121 (3d ed. 1988) (usages of trade "are 
relevant not only to the interpretation of express contract terms, but may them-
selves constitute contract terms [and] these sources may not only supplement or 
qualify express terms, but in appropriate circumstances, may even override express 
terms."). 
Professors White and Summers suggest three legal effects of a usage of 
trade in addition to giving particular meaning to the language of a contract: add-
ing express terms to a contract; subtracting terms from a contract; and supersed-
ing or varying the effect of U.C.C. provisions that are variable by agreement and 
which would govern in the absence of a usage of trade. Id. at 122-24. However, 
whether a usage of trade can contradict the plain meaning of express contractual 
language is uncertain. On the one hand, official comment 2 to Section 2-202 states 
that a writing is to be read on the assumption that the parties took a usage of 
trade for granted and the usage is an element of the contract unless carefully 
negated. On the other hand, Section 1-205(4) indicates that an express term con-
trols usage of trade where the two are inconsistent. See Kologel Co. v. Down in 
the Village, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 727, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that under 
Section 1-205(4), a usage of trade that delivery of goods pursuant to an airway bill 
of lading is made to a "notify party" cannot overrule express language in the bill 
of lading that delivery must be made to the consignee). 
r 
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actual expectations which should be given full effect in the 
law. The treatment of trade usage as a part of the agreement 
in section 1-205 provides a foundation for these principles.97 
Interestingly, the first significant case decided under Section 1-205 
illustrates the point. In Provident Tradesman's Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Pemberton,98 a bank financed a car dealer and the dealer's customer 
in connection with the customer's purchase of a new car.99 According 
to the security agreement between the bank and dealer, neither party 
was required to provide a notice of any kind to the other party. How-
ever, a trade usage existed whereby a bank would notify a dealer if 
the insurance policy of the dealer's customer lapsed so that the dealer 
could get its own insurance coverage. The bank did not provide notice 
of the lapse in the customer's policy, and after lapse the car was 
wrecked in an accident. The dealer refused to pay for the car, and the 
bank sued the dealer. The bank conceded the existence of a trade 
usage calling for notices, but it relied on the wording of the security 
agreement to the contrary. 
The court held for the dealer, allowing a trade usage to qualify 
the security agreement and thereby establish an independent legal 
obligation, notwithstanding contrary language in the agreement. The 
court based its reasoning on the official comment to Section 2-202 
which indicates that "the usages of the trade were taken for granted 
when the contract was phrased [and] [u]nless carefully negated they 
have become an element of the meaning of the words used. "100 Go-
ing forward, banks, car dealers, and customers could be certain that 
notices would be required. The usage was a legal foundation for giv-
ing notice that superseded even a contrary express contractual provi-
sion. Therefore, the usage was a means of regulating the risk of de-
fault on a financing loan. 
Second, official comment 4 to Section 1-205 is equally prone to 
misinterpretation. This comment takes a schizophrenic approach 
toward usages. On the one hand, the comment distinguishes between 
mandatory rules of law and rules that the parties can vary by agree-
97. Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, 
"Express Terms," and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777, 780 (1986) (citations omitted, emphasis supplied). 
98. 173 A2d 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961). 
99. ld. at 173 A.2d 780, 781-83. For Levie, Provident stands for the proposi-
tion that a usage of trade may establish that a contract does not accurately reflect 
the intention of the parties. See Levie, supra note 85, at 1112. However, as sug-
gested above, a different but compatible view of the case is that recognized usages 
are a source of independent legal obligation. 
100. Provident, 173 A2d at 784. 
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ment. The latter type of rules "fill in points which the parties have 
not considered and in fact agreed upon." Plainly, trade usages can 
take precedence over variable rules: 
The latter rules [those that can be abrogated by agreement] 
· hold "unless otherwise agreed" but yield to the contrary agree-
ment of the parties. Part of the agreement of the parties to 
which such rules yield is to be sought for in the usages of 
trade which furnish the background and give particular mean-
ing to the language used, and are the framework of common 
understanding controlling any general rules of law which hold 
only when there is no such understanding.101 
On the other hand, the comment says that a trade usage is "a factor 
in reaching the commercial meaning of the agreement which the 
parties have made." The comment also indicates that by choosing the 
term "usage of trade" instead of "custom" the U.C.C. "expresses its 
intent to reject those cases which see evidence of 'custom' as repre-
senting an effort to displace or negate 'established rules of law.'" 
Courts and scholars may overemphasize these aspects of the 
comment at the expense of the emphasized portions in the above-
quoted passage. Yet, such overemphasis is unwarranted. The c~m­
ment plainly invites market participants to develop their own govern-
ing law in the form of trade usages, and the U.C.C. fulfills an inter-
stitial function. Thus, in a world of reinvigorated usages, express 
contractual terms and even U.C.C. provisions are gap-fillers, not 
trade usages. 102 
101. U.C.C. § 1-205, cmt. 4 (emphasis supplied). 
102. This approach is intimated by some court decisions that accord great 
weight to usages of trade in the absence of express contractual terms or in the 
face of potentially conflicting terms. See, e.g., Barry Gilberg, Ltd. v. Craftex Corp., 
665 F. Supp. 585, 591 (N.D.lli. 1987) ("[w]here no stipulation is included in a 
parties' contract, the . . . usages of trade are presumed to form a part of the con-
tract, provided the same are known to the parties or provided the parties are 
chargeable with knowledge thereof'); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 
664 F.2d 772, 795 (9th Cir. 1981) ("only if [usages of trade] cannot be reasonably 
reconciled with the express terms of the contract are they not binding on the par-
ties"). For a discussion of Nanakuli and judicial interpretations of Section 1-205(4), 
see Kastely, supra note 97, at 782-96. This approach also is suggested by certain 
scholars. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 629-31 (1975); John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. REv. 269, 
299 (1972); Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An 
Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 
250-53 (1966). 
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C. Toward a Broad Role and Self-Regulation 
1. Legislative Intent 
901 
Whatever the reason for the narrow interpretive role, it is unsat-
isfactory because it ignores both legislative intent and the relation-
ship between trade usages and the law merchant. AB discussed 
above, trade usages are omnipresent in Article 2. 103 From this fact 
it may be inferred that the drafters of the U.C.C. envisioned a great-
er role for trade usages than the narrow textual interpretations criti-
cized above would admit. 104 As Professor Kastely's above-quoted 
observation suggests, Section 1-205 was designed in part to elevate 
the importance of trade usages from gap fillers to essential ingredi-
ents of a contract. 105 
More generally, the drafters surely wanted a flexible commercial 
code that would accommodate new commercial practices, not a rigid 
one that would soon become antiquated.105 Thus, in 1955 the New 
York Law Revision Commission suggested a broad role for usages, 
stating that "usage affects not only terms but the over-all legal rela-
tionE! of the parties, and it would seem that this idea might well be 
expressed in the proposed [Uniform Commercial] Code."107 The 
Commission further noted that: 
[T]he "adoption" of ... a usage as a rule of law is not a mere 
duplication or reiteration; something is added to it by giving it 
legal consequences. Therefore, the lawmaker's problem is not 
merely whether the usage is a good one for those subject to it, 
but also whether it is appropriate for implementation by the 
heavy hand of the law.105 
If the U.C.C. is to have any relevance in governing high-technology, 
cross-border transactions of the 21st century, and if it is to respond 
suitably to the needs of participants in those transactions, then a 
trade usage will have to be more than a passive post hoc device for 
103. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra III.B.2. Indeed, under pre-U.C.C. contract law, the common 
practices of a trade were used to fill gaps left in an express contract. See Kastely, 
supra note 97, at 778. 
105. See Kastely, supra note 97, at 779. 
106. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b); N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION STUDY, su-
pra note 85, at 14-15, 79-80. 
107. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 85, at 325. 
108. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 85, at 77. But see 
supra note 84 (suggesting that usages are interpretive aids). 
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disputants to interpret contractual ambiguities. 109 It will have to be 
acknowledged as a legitimate pro-active a priori tool of self-regula-
tion for non-disputants. 
It is interesting to observe that the broad role for trade usages 
advocated herein is consistent with certain international standards 
regarding usages. For example, Article 1.8 of the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples on International Commercial Contracts states that "[t]he parties 
are bound by a usage that is widely known to and regularly observed 
in international trade by parties in the particular trade concerned 
except where the application of such a usage would be unreason-
able."110 In contrast to Section 1-205, the Principles eschew poten-
tially ·problematic formulations like "give particular meaning" or 
"supplement or qualify." Thus, their broad language gives legal effect 
to trade usages. 
2. The Law Merchant 
Confining trade usages to the role of an interpretive device ig-
nores the potential relationship between Sections 1-205 and 1-103. 
Section 1-103-in addition to legislative intent and appropriate textu-
al interpretation-is a possible basis on which to justify a broad self-
regulatory role for usages. This Section, which "is probably the most 
important single provision in the [Uniform Commercial] Code,"111 
recognizes the continuing vitality of the law merchant.112 Indeed, 
109. For an early discussion of the extent to which trade usages address the 
concerns of commercial parties, see JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 290-91 
(1964). 
110. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
IN UNIDROIT, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 19 
(1994). "UNIDROIT" is the French acronym for the "International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law." Id. 
111. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 96, at 6. For treatments of Section 1-103, 
see David Frisch, Buyer's Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: The Case for Mis-
take and the Indeterminacy of U.C.C. Section 1-103, 43 ARK. L. REv. 291 (1990); 
Robert A. Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-
103 and "Code Methodology," 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 655 (1977); Robert S. 
Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 906 (1978); Steve H. Nickles, Problems of Sources 
of Law Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code - Part I: The Method-
ological Problem and the Civil Law Approach, 31 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1977), Steve H. 
Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code - Part II: The English Approach and a Solution to the Methodological Prob-
lem, 31 ARK. L. REV. 171 (1977); Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951). 
112. Section 1-103 states: 
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for centuries the law merchant has been a source of legal obligation 
and thereby a means of self-regulation: 
As a general rule "merchant law" embodied a respect for "mer-
chant" practice as a primary source of regulation and the 
"law" as a secondary control over commerce .... The ordinary 
undertakings of merchants were binding because they were 
"intended" to be binding, not because any law compelled such 
performance. Mandatory law was not to impede the self-suffi-
cient pacts of the merchants. 
As a predominant rule, the agreement remained an overriding 
force in regulating mercantile conduct. All else was subservi-
ent to its dominating function as a regulator of behavior. The 
merchant himself was to be master of his own destiny. 113 
Thus, a usage of trade that qualified as law merchant not only would 
have a legal foundation in Section 1-103 but also would serve as a 
self-regulatory device precisely because it is law merchant. 114 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant . . . shall supplement its 
provisions. 
u.c.c. § 1-103. 
P The "law merchant" is defined as the "[b)ody of law governing commercial 
transactions which had its origin in [the] common law of England regulating mer-
chants." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 886 (6th ed. 1990). A "merchant" is defined in 
Section 2-104(1) as: 
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation 
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or 
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may 
be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermedi-
ary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or 
skill. 
U.C.C. § 2-104. Undoubtedly, Bangkok Bank and Citibank qualify as "merchants." 
113. LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL 
LAW 10 (1983) (emphasis supplied). 
114. This justification begs a threshold question, namely, whether the law 
merchant is a static body of law whose development stopped in England in the 
seventeenth century. To be sure, Section 1-103 "has become increasingly cryptic, is 
relied upon infrequently, and is usually only a minor factor in a decision when it 
is referred to .... " Peter Winship, Contemporary Commercial Law Literature in 
the United States, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 643, 645 n.8 (1982). However, historically, an 
integral link existed between the law merchant and usages of trade. As Professor 
Farnsworth writes: 
The origins of the Uniform Commercial Code lie in the law merchant, a 
specialized body of usages, or customs, that governed contracts dealing 
with commercial matters until the seventeenth century. The law merchant 
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The problem is one of delineation: when does a usage of trade 
become part of the body of the law merchant?115 Is it sufficient that 
the Section 1-205 standard is met, i.e., a practice that qualifies as a 
usage of trade automatically is admitted to the body of law mer-
chant?116 Or, should additional tests-perhaps concerning the 
length of time the practice has been used and the extent to which the 
practice is used in markets in different countries-be imposed? To be 
sure, reinvigorating a usage of trade is facilitated by eliminating or 
minimizing legal formalities that block the usage from becoming law 
merchant. Yet, if no additional tests are imposed, then there is no 
meaningful distinction between a usage of trade and the law mer-
chant. In turn, the integrity of the law merchant may be questioned 
as critics decry the entry into the law merchant of trade usages that 
have not "stood the test of time" or lack adequate notoriety. 
One possible solution is based on the jurisprudence of Section 1-
103. That Section implicitly delegates power to merchants to estab-
lish their own legally cognizable rules. If merchants can establish the 
rules, then possibly they should be allowed to establish certain rules 
was applied by courts composed of merchants convened to pass on dis-
putes that arose at the fairs that were the centers for much of early 
trade. . . . In controversies between merchants, [Lord Mansfield, Chief 
Justice of the King's Bench] . . . made it a point to ascertain and apply 
the usages of the trade, sometimes using a special jury of merchants to 
advise him on commercial practices. 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 26 (emphasis supplied). See also MORTON J. 
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 155-59 (1977) 
(discussing the use of merchant juries in the U.S. in the late 1700s). Of course, 
Professor Lleweylln's recommendation that juries comprised of merchants should 
decide commercial cases was rejected by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws in 1942 because it was thought to be inappropriate for 
laypersons to create legal rules. See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: 
Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465, at 512-13, 527-29 
(1987). There seems little reason why this link should be ignored today. Usages of 
trade developed by parties in global electronic markets can and should be consid-
ered part of an evolving body of law merchant. See TRAKMAN, supra note 113, at 
3-4, 45-60 (observing that the international law merchant continues to evolve and 
arguing that usages in the international crude oil market adapt to meet the 
changing needs of that market). 
115. This question appears to have received relatively less attention than the 
question of when the law merchant became part of the common law. See, e.g., 
WYNDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE RoMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT 17-25 (1923). 
116. A related question is what the law merchant adds in light of the fact 
that the U.C.C. expressly allows trade usages to be a component of an agreement. 
One answer is that the law merchant is a system that encompasses not only the 
terms of an agreement but also rules for its enforcement and remedies for breach. 
In contrast, usages pertain only to a particular practice associated with the agree-
ment. 
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about rules. That is, merchants should decide when a trade usage 
becomes law merchant and thereby imposes legally enforceable obli-
gations. Naturally, the delineation rules established for the global 
currency bazaar by trade associations like the New York Foreign 
Exchange Committee117 may differ from those established by associ-
ations in other global electronic markets. Consequently, each market 
can reinvigorate trade usages in the manner best suited to its 
needs. 118 
V. REINVIGORATING TRADE USAGES 
A. Advantages of Self-Regulation 
Four compelling reasons justify broadening the role of Section 1-
205 so that participants in global electronic markets can engage in 
self-regulation through their trade usages. First, a usage reduces 
uncertainty by conferring legal authorization to participants to en-
gage in a practice. Second, a usage protects the participants' expecta-
tions. Third, a usage fosters efficiency in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Fourth, the concept of a usage is particularly flexible and partici-
pants can develop usages to adjust to new technological conditions. 
1. Reducing Uncertainty 
A "usage of trade" can be a powerful tool for reducing uncertain-
ty by serving as a source of legal obligation and thereby an instru-
ment of self-regulation. If a practice satisfies the minimal U.C.C. 
criteria for a "usage of trade," then parties engaged in that practice 
should be entitled to view the practice as legally authorized. In sum, 
if it is a usage, then ipso facto it should be permissible. 
To achieve this result, a change is needed in the way Section 1-
205 is interpreted in theory and used in practice. The link between 
"supplementing" or "qualifying" an agreement and "developing a 
common framework of understanding," on the one hand, and reducing 
· uncertainty, on the other hand, must be reexamined. The sine qua 
non of this link is authority. A practice that is a trade usage provides 
authorization to engage in, and legal support for, a particular market 
practice. Authority is certainty. Market participants can be certain as 
to the legal permissibility of the practice. By supplementing and 
qualifying their agreement through trade usages, they effectively 
write their own law. 
117. See supra note 25. 
118. See generally TRAKMAN, supra note 113, at 40-43 (discussing the evolving 
international law merchant through trade associations, codes, and conventions). 
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In the global currency bazaar, switches can gain a legal founda-
tion as a trade usage that supplements and qualifies an oral foreign 
exchange contract. In turn, the players can be certain of their ability 
to avoid unwanted credit risks. Thus, in the Bangkok Bank-Citibank 
transaction, where there is no dispute as to the terms of the agree-
ment, the question is whether the players are bound to a contract 
that one does not like because of the attendant credit risk. Each 
player needs to know whether a right to a switch supplements or 
qualifies their oral agreement. Section 1-205 can provide an affirma-
tive answer. With reinvigorated usages, Bangkok Bank and Citibank 
can confidently and correctly assume that in a brokered foreign ex-
change transaction neither will be required to assume an unwanted 
credit risk. Cloaked with the authority of a usage of trade, switches 
will reduce uncertainty as to the avoidance of undesirable credit risk 
exposures.119 
119. Of course, switches do not entirely eliminate uncertainty. A switch of 
counterparties cannot eliminate completely Herstatt risk because there is a possi-
bility (however remote) that the new counterparty, Fuji Bank, will be closed or 
become insolvent. However, insofar as credit risk is lowered through a switch, so 
too is Herstatt risk. 
Herstatt risk would be eliminated completely if settlements could occur in 
the same time zone. A centralized foreign exchange clearinghouse that includes a 
settlement facility might allow for simultaneous, single-time zone settlement. 
Herstatt risk also would be avoided if a twenty-four hour, multi-currency 
payments system existed. Yet, thus far, this system does not exist, and the spot 
deal above illustrates the use of current single-currency payments systems. The 
yen will be delivered by Bangkok Bank to a yen-denominated account of Bangkok 
Bank in Japan because yen payments are made through the Japanese payments 
system. Conversely, dollars will be delivered by Bangkok Bank to a dollar-denomi-
nated account of Bangkok Bank in the U.S. Dollar payments are made through 
the U.S. payments system, namely the Federal Reserve wire transfer network 
(Fedwire) or CHIPS. See supra note 63. 
The principal barriers to the development of multi-currency systems appear 
to be political and economic, not technological. The U.S. is not prepared for dollar 
transfers to be handled through a network that it does not own, operate, or at 
least regulate in some fashion. Such an arrangement would imply a diminution of 
sovereignty insofar as control over one's own currency is an important manifesta-
tion of independence and authority. Moreover, it might have untoward monetary 
policy effects. If overdrafts could be created in dollar-denominated accounts held at, 
for example, the Bank of Japan as part of a Tokyo-based multi-currency system, 
then a foreign central bank effectively would have the power to grant credit in the 
U.S. currency. Presently, that power remains with the Federal Reserve and U.S.-
regulated commercial banks. 
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2. Protecting Expectations 
No bank trading foreign exchange wants to be stuck with a poor 
credit risk exposure, and every bank wants the ability to regulate its 
own exposures. Before they learn the identity of their counterparty, 
Bangkok Bank and Citibank have two expectations upon entry into a 
brokered foreign exchange transaction. First, each player expects that 
its counterparty will perform its central obligation, namely, deliver 
the appropriate amount and type of currency on the value date. Sec-
ond, each player expects that it will not exceed a counterparty trad-
ing limit as a result of the new transaction. 120 If, after learning the 
identity of the counterparty, a doubt exists as to the fulfillment of 
either expectation, then a credit risk problem persists. Switching 
· counterparties is the means for handling a failure of either of these 
expectations. 
As a vehicle for private credit risk regulation, switches are con-
sistent with the key purpose of giving legal effect to trade usages, 
namely, the preservation of expectancy interests. This purpose is 
apparent from the definition of "usage of trade" in Section 1-205(2), 
which speaks of a "regularity of observance" that "justi[fies] an expec-
tation" that the practice in question will be observed. Indeed, "[t]he 
reasoning behind section 1-205 is straightforward: if a contract can 
be defined by shared expectations, and if those expectations were 
created by trade usage, then the contract should be defined by trade 
usage. "121 Giving legal effect to switches as a trade usage protects 
the expectations that Bangkok Bank and Citibank have about the 
right to switch. 
3. Flexibility 
A trade usage is an attractive device fot self-regulation because 
of its flexibility. This flexibility is evident from the ease with which a 
usage comes into existence and the ease with which it can be proved 
in court. 122 One reason for this ease lies in the contrast between a 
120. See supra note 42. 
121. Kastely, supra note 97, at 781 (citations omitted). However, the reference 
to expectations in Section 1-205(2) has been critici2ed as poorly drafted because (1) 
while it appears to refer to the objective theory of contracts, in fact it calls for a 
court to look to what the parties expected and, therefore, is subjective, and (2) it 
does not establish which party has the burden of proof to show the existence of 
the usage. See Levie, supra note 85, at 1108. 
122. While the U.C.C. does not specify which party has the burden of proving 
the existence of a usage of trade, courts impose that burden on the party who 
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trade usage and the old English law concept of a "custom." As Profes-
sor Warren explains: 
Through the first quarter of this century, a common law con-
cept of custom governed the use by courts of trade practices to 
interpret disputed contracts. A litigant who asserted that a 
trade practice should govern interpretation of a disputed con-
tract would have to meet well-established, exacting require-
ments. Not only did the custom have to be reasonable, contin-
uous, notorious, certain, universal, and legal-the common 
law required that it must have been of such duration that "the 
memory of man runneth not to the contrary."123 
Today, virtually every market in the cross-border financial services 
industry experiences rapid changes in technology-the global curren-
cy bazaar is only one case in point. Consequently, the concept of a 
custom is antiquated and unworkable because technological shifts 
compress the time period in which new practices develop. To require 
ten or twenty years before a practice becomes a legally cognizable 
custom is nonsensical. In that period, several generations of "cus-
toms" will have come and gone. 
The drafters of the U.C.C. wisely eschewed the inflexibility asso-
ciated with the concept of a custom. As official comment 5 to Section 
1-205 states: 
A usage of trade under subsection (2) [of Section 1-205] must 
have the "regularity of observance" specified. The ancient 
English tests for "custom" are abandoned in this connection. 
Therefore, it is not required that a usage of trade be "ancient 
or immemorial," "universal" or the like. Under the require-
ment of subsection (2) full recognition is thus available for 
new usages and for usages currently observed by the great 
asserts the existence and seeks the benefit of the usage. See, e.g., Wright v. Com-
mercial & Sav. Bank, 464 A2d 1080, 1083 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) ("[o]bviously, the 
party asserting the practice would be required to carry the burden of proof'). See 
also WIDTE & SUMMERS, supra note 96, at 128. 
123. Warren, supra note 85, at 518-19 (citations omitted). See also Chen, su· 
pra note 85, at 95-98 (discussing pre-U.C.C. cases on usages); Levie, supra note 
85, at 1103 ("[t]o be enforceable at common law a custom had to be: (1) legal, (2) 
notorious, (3) ancient or immemorial and continuous, (4) reasonable, (5) certain, (6) 
universal and obligatory."); Note, supra note 82, at 1198-1203 (discussing the Eng-
lish requirements for a custom). See also N.Y. LAW REvisiON COMMISSION STUDY, 
supra note 85, at 43-46, 76-78, 321-22 (discussing custom as law and trade usag-
es). 
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majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut 
comers do not agree. 124 
909 
In addition, the drafters did not preserve other traditional require-
ments. For example, the statute does not require that a usage of 
trade be certain or precise.125 Nor does it require that a usage be 
well-known, much less universal. 126 Accordingly, modem courts rec-
ognize that proof of repeated, long-standing applications is not the 
only way of establishing the existence of a trade usage.127 Regulari-
ty of observance-"the recognition and acceptance within [an] ... 
industry sufficient 'to justify an expectation that [a practice] ... will 
be observed ... .'"126-is an equally acceptable way to establish a 
usage. 129 Because of this alternative, the concept of a trade usage is 
124. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 5. (emphasis supplied) 
125. See Levie, supra note 85, at 1107. Official comment 9 to Section 1-205 
states that a usage need not be certain or precise. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 9. See also 
REsTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 222 cmt. b (indicating that even under the com-
mon law many of the traditional requirements have been eliminated). 
Of course, a usage ·of trade cannot vary a rule of law that the parties 
could not otherwise vary by agreement. See, e.g., Farmers Coop. Assn. v. Cole, 239 
N.W. 808 (N.D. 1976) (disallowing an enlargement of the exceptions to the statute 
of frauds by a usage of trade). 
126. See Levie, supra note 85, at 1107-08. Section 1-205(2) implicitly says that 
a usage need not be universal by requiring that a usage be observed by the "great . 
majority of decent dealers." U.C.C. § 1-205(2). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 
50, § 222 cmt. b (indicating that even under the common law many of the tra-
ditional requirements have been eliminated). 
127. See, e.g., Posttapes Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 409 
n.3, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (discussing the economic rationale for a trade usage in 
the film industry whereby a film manufacturer's liability is limited to the replace-
ment of faulty ftlm). 
128. Id. at 409 n.3. 
129. See, e.g., B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339 (D. 
N.J. 1983), affd in part, vacated in part, 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984), on remand 
617 F.Supp. 49 (D. N.J. 1985) (holding that use of a retainage assessment on 
deliveries of scrap gold to a jewelry manufacturer was not so prevalent to be a 
usage of trade); Sun Oil Co. v. M!l' "Mercedes Maria", C.A. No. 80-4862 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 29, 1982) (renumbered No. 81-1033, 81-1083, and 81-4021) (holding that there 
is a regularity of observance as to a 0.5 percent transit loss allowance in the car-
riage of oil). 
To be sure, usages provide greater certainty for parties as to how their 
agreements will be interpreted if tested in court. In the narrow interpretive role, 
there is no a priori test for determining exactly how much evidence is needed to 
establish a usage of trade. It is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Not surprisingly, disputes arise as to whether a usage exists. See, e.g., 
Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 789 F.2d 1128, 1143 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing whether a 
usage of trade exists regarding authorization for the collection of stripper well gas 
rates in natural gas sales contracts); Wright v. Commercial & Sav. Bank, 464 A.2d 
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better suited to parties in technologically sensitive markets seeking a 
legal foundation for new practices that meet their changing 
needs.130 In fact, already, switches may satisfy the test for recogni-
tion as a trade usage. Every day there are many instances of switch-
es, hence demonstrating repeated applications should not be difficult. 
Moreover, participants in the foreign exchange market are well 
aware of, and generally accept the practice, hence there is regularity 
of observance. 131 
A second reason that proving the existence of a trade usage is 
straightforward is the guidance provided by official comment 7 to 
Section 1-205. That comment indicates that "usages may be either 
general to trade or particular to a special branch of trade." Hence, 
even if a practice is limited to a particular geographical area or kind 
of activity, it still may qualify as a usage. It is not necessary for 
switches to occur in every foreign exchange trading center around the 
1080 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that removal of a name from a joint bank ac-
count was not a usage of trade in light of the lack of testimonial evidence to the 
contrary); Carl Wagner & Sons v. Appendagez, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 762, 771-72 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing whether acceptance of a salesman's orders at a 
company's home office is a condition precedent to the establishment of a contract 
is a trade usage). 
It is clear that to establish a usage of trade, testimonial evidence - typi-
cally, expert testimony - is needed. See e.g., Western Indus. v. Newcor Canada 
Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1201-03 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that the district court im-
properly excluded testimony about an alleged trade usage from lay witnesses who 
readily could qualify as experts); In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 12 B.R. 697, 709 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (rejecting a claim of a trade usage in the absence of expert testi-
mony); Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 971-72 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(using deposition testimony to establish a trade usage). See also CALAMARI & 
PERILLO, supra note 82, at 179; FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 510. 
130. See, e.g., Posttapes Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 409 
n.3 (1978) (discussing the economic rationale for a trade usage in the film industry 
whereby a film manufacturer's liability is limited to the replacement of faulty 
film). 
131. The acceptance of the practice is clear from anecdotal evidence and the 
numerous public statements about switches issued by the Federal Reserve through 
the New York Foreign Exchange Committee. See, e.g., Teel Letter, supra note 45 
(discussing the current practice); SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON TRADING PRACTICES OF THE 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMI'ITEE, INTERIM REPORT ON LEGAL IsSUES REGARDING 
SWITCHES (Jan. 27, 1993) (on file with author); ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 
25, at 7, 73-74 (concerning guidelines for trading practices); Suggested Approach to 
Brokers' Switches, Paper distributed at meeting of Trading Practices Subcommittee 
of the Foreign Exchange Committee (Sept. 3, 1992) (on file with author). 
Ideally, the relevant foreign exchange trading associations, such as the 
New York Foreign Exchange Committee and the British Bankers' Association, 
should develop a handbook which expressly condones switches as a trade usage. 
See text accompanying infra note 150. 
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world, or that they occur in every type of foreign exchange transac-
tion, in order for the switch from Citibank to Fuji Bank to be legally 
permissible as a usage. 
Finally, proving the existence of a trade usage is easy because it 
is not necessary for an affected market participant to have actual 
knowledge of a usage of trade to be bound by that usage. AB the 
statutory language indicates, constructive knowledge suffices: "any 
usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which [the parties] are 
engaged or of which they are or should be aware" can impart "par-
ticular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agree-
ment. "132 The disjunctive language indicates that constructive 
knowledge can take one of two forms: either the participant should 
have known of the usage, or the participant engages in the trade and 
thus knowledge can be presumed.133 Plainly, new participants in a 
global electronic market have an incentive to master promptly trade 
usages in their market.134 
The ease with which the current practice of switches can be 
recognized as a usage of trade has an important future implication. It 
must be anticipated that Bangkok Bank, Citibank, and other players 
in the global currency bazaar will develop new methods for managing 
counterparty credit risk in foreign exchange transactions. These 
inethods might supersede or refine the practice of switches. Such 
132. U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (emphasis supplied). See Warren, supra note 85, at 515 
(providing a rationale for this rule). 
133. See, e.g., Foxco Indus., Ltd. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 
1979) (holding that the term "first quality goods" was specifically defined in the 
relevant association standards guidebook and was a usage of trade even though 
the buyer was unaware of this definition). . 
The U.C.C. appears to give broader scope for usage of trade than the com-
mon law. Under the common law, a commercial party is bound by a usage of 
trade of which he either knows or has reason to know. Flower City Painting Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Gumina Construction Company, 591 F.2d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, § 247 cmt. b (1928}). 
However, as explained above, under Section 2-105(3) there are two tests to 
determine whether a commercial party is bound by a trade usage. First, as under 
the common law, a party is bound if it "knew or had reason to know." See 
Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1976) (in-
dicating that even if a party does not expressly negotiate a provision to which a 
trade usage is applicable, the party is bound by that usage if the party should 
have been aware of the usage). Second, unlike the common law,. a party is bound 
by a usage of trade in the trade in which it is engaged, whether or not it actually 
knew or should have known of the usage. See Marion Coal Co. v. Marc Rich & 
Co. Inti., 539 F. Supp. 903, 905-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (concerning an agreement to 
arbitrate in a contract for coal). 
134. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 95 (4th ed. 1992). 
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methods should provide the parties with at least as much legal cer-
tainty as switches afford. Because of the ease of establishing a prac-
tice as a usage, this goal can be realized. 
4. Efficiency 
It is widely understood that a clear aim of the U.C.C. is to pro-
mote efficiency in commercial transactions: 
A primary purpose of commercial law is to provide the rules 
that protect the stream of commerce by allowing it to function 
as efficiently as possible. The Code is infused with· an idea 
about how goods and services are distributed throughout the 
economy. Section after section of the Code is clearly designed 
to make transactions less costly, thereby encouraging 
allocative efficiency. 135 
Trade usages are an efficient means of self-regulation. They make 
contract formation, interpretation, and performance efficient by re-
ducing transaction costs, i.e., the costs associated with negotiating, 
consummating, and executing a deal. 136 
As repeat players, banks in the global currency bazaar grow 
accustomed to short-hand expressions by which billions of dollars,· 
yen, pounds, marks, ringgit and rupiah are bought and sold every 
day .. These expressions are particularly significant because profits 
depend in part on completing a large volume of transactions where 
the. profit margin on each transaction is thin. Images of global elec-
tronic markets presented every night on any business news television 
program accurately depict foreign exchange or other financial market 
players reacting instantaneously to sudden price changes brought 
about by fresh economic and political data. For them, nothing-not 
even lunch!--ought to impede the flow of deals. There is a direct rela-
tionship between reducing transaction costs and lowering opportunity 
costs.137 Every second of delay in completing one transaction is an 
opportunity cost because it represents an impediment to the entry 
and execution of another deal. 138 
135. Warren, supra note 85, at 535 (citations omitted). 
136. For an economic analysis of the reason why Section 1-205(3) presumes 
knowledge of a usage of trade by a party engaged in the trade, see Warren, supra 
note 85, at 535-46. 
137. The latter concerns foregone opportunities, that is, for example, a cost to 
Bangkok Bank and Citibank of lost trading possibilities created by the rapidly 
changing dollar-yen exchange rate. 
138. The foregoing analysis should not imply that usages of trade lead to 
unmitigated economic benefits. For example, usages of trade can raise costs of 
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The gains accruing to two players trading foreign exchange that 
result from reducing transaction costs are shown in the graph below. 
The graph is a static snapshot of the global dollar-yen market on a 
particular day. The price of yen bought and sold is expressed in mil-
lions of dollars and measured on the vertical axis. The quantity of 
yen bought and sold is expressed in billions and measured on the 
horizontal axis. The downward-sloping curve represents the total 
demand for yen of all banks playing in the foreign exchange market 
that are willing and able to sell yen. 139 The upward-sloping curve 
represents the total supply of yen of all banks playing in the foreign 
exchange market that are willing and able to sell yen.140 
entry into the foreign exchange market because potential new entrants must learn 
those usages. This result is particularly likely when new entrants are charged with 
constructive knowledge of the usages pursuant to Section 1-205(3). See Warren, 
supra note 85 at 557-69. However, Professor Warren's example of this possibility 
in illustration VII at pp .. 563-67 is incorrect. Contrary to her explanation, party A 
will enter the market with total production costs of A1 or A2 (because these costs 
are below expected revenue), whereas party C will itot enter the market with total 
production costs of either C1 or C2. 
More generally, Professor Warren's explanation that the parties compare 
total production costs, amortized over time, to anticipated revenue, is oversimpli-
fied. In the short run (the period during which some factors of production are 
fixed), a seller will enter a market only if it can cover its variable costs of produc-
tion (the costs that vary with the level of output). If it can, then it will produce 
along its marginal cost curve where this curve intersects the bottom of the seller's 
average variable cost curve. Hence, the "shutdown point" for the seller is where 
the market price of the good is so low that neither variable nor fixed costs are re-
couped. (The latter are costs associated with fixed commitments to invariable fac-
tors of production.) It would be economically irrational to produce a good if it 
results in a loss greater than fixed costs incurred when the seller produces noth-
ing. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 431-32 (11th ed. 1980). 
In the long run (the period during which all factors of production can be 
changed), the "break-even" equilibrium is where price and marginal cost are equal 
and the marginal cost curve intersects the bottom of the average total cost curve. 
At that point (and above), all costs are recovered. A seller will decide whether to 
enter (or exit) a market by comparing the price that can be earned for the good 
sold with the marginal cost of producing the good. So long as price equals or ex-
ceeds marginal cost, entry is economically rational See id. at 445-46. 
139. The demand curve is sloped downward because of the inverse relation-
ship between the price of the yen (measured in dollars) and the quantity of yen 
demanded by banks. 
140. The' supply curve slopes upward because of the direct relationship be-
tween the price of yen (again, measured in dollars) and the quantity of yen banks 
offer for sale. The demand and supply curves are based on the implicit ceteris 
paribus assumption, i.e., the price of all other currencies, income of Citibank and 
Bangkok Bank, and preferences of the two banks for different currencies remain 
constant. For a complete overview of demand and supply curves, see SAMUELSON, 
supra note 138, at 52-64. 
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The Relationship Between Transaction Costs 
and Foreign Exchange Traders' Surpluses 
Price of yen 










Quantity of yen bought and sold 
(in billions) 
L ABDI is Citibank's buyer's surplus with no transaction costs . 
. 2. ABCJ is Citibank's buyer's surplus with $2 million transaction costs. 
3. GFDI is Bangkok Bank's seller's surplus with no transaction costs. 
4. GFEH is Bangkok Bank's seller's surplus with $2 million transaction 
costs. 
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Suppose Citibank is willing and able to pay 90 yen per dollar for 
the 5 billion yen, i.e., a total cost of $55.56 million.141 If Citibank 
could purchase the yen for a lower total cost (requiring an exchange 
rate of greater than 90 yen per dollar), then the difference between 
what Citibank actually paid and $55.56 million would be "buyer's 
surplus" that would accrue to Citibank. 142 Conversely, suppose 
Bangkok Bank is willing and able to receive 110 yen per dollar, i.e., a 
total revenue of $45.45 million. 143 If Bangkok Bank could sell the 
yen for a greater total revenue (which would imply an exchange rate 
of less than 110 yen per dollar), then the difference between what 
Bangkok Bank actually received and $45.45 million would be "seller's 
surplus" that accrued to Bangkok Bank. 144 
Buyer's and seller's surpluses are maximized simultaneously in 
an environment of no transaction costs. With no such costs, the equi-
librium exchange rate is 100 yen per dollar. This rate implies 
Citibank pays $50 million and earns a surplus of $5.56 million, 145 
and Bangkok Bank receives $50 million and earns a surplus of $4.54 
million. 146 These surpluses are shown by the figures denoted by the 
points ABDI and GFDI, respectively. 
Of course, Citibank deals with potential sellers through the New 
York Broker which receives a commission for successfully finding a 
counterparty with which Citibank agrees to deal. Moreover, Citibank 
must pay overhead costs associated with foreign exchange transac-
tions-the telephone bill, electronic database fees (i.e., the cost of the 
Reuters screen), subscriptions to financial market research journals, 
etc. These facts are true for Bangkok Bank as well. Assume the 
transaction costs for each player are $2 million. The existence of such 
costs does not change the ability and willingness of Citibank to pay 
$55.56 million or Bangkok Bank to receive $45.45 million, but it does 
reduce their respective buyer's and seller's surpluses by $2 million 
141. The exact figure is $55,555,555.56. 
142. The technical economic term is "consumers' surplus." See SAMUElSON, su-
pra note 138, at 412-14; M. BLAUG, EcONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 374-88 (3d 
ed. 1978). In general, consumers' surplus is the excess of the price which a con-
sumer would be willing to pay for a good rather than go without that good over 
the price the consumer actually pays. Id. at 375. 
143. The exact figure is $45,454,545.45. 
144. The technical economic term is "producers' surplus." In general, 
producers' surplus is the excess of actual earnings from selling a good over the 
amount the seller would accept rather than refuse to offer the good altogether. See 
BLAUG, supra note 142, at 404-09. 
145. The exact figure is $5,555,555.56. 
146. The exact figure is $4,545,454.55. 
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each. In effect, transaction costs raise the price Citibank pays and 
lowers the sum Bangkok Bank receives because each bank must 
absorb such costs. In the figure, transaction costs raise Citibank's 
effective price to 96.15 yen per dollar and lowers Bangkok Bank's 
effective price to 104.17 yen per dollar. Consequently, the buyer's 
surplus is reduced to $3.56 million, 147 and seller's surplus is re-
duced to $2.54 million.148 The reduced surpluses are shown in the 
graph by the figures ABCJ and GFEH, respectively. Plainly, the total 
loss of buyer's and seller's surplus is $4 million, or the figure 
JCDEH.149 In the extreme case, where transaction costs rise to 
roughly $5 million, the deal is aborted because the buyer's and 
seller's surpluses are entirely wiped out. _ 
Legal recognition of trade usages helps minimize the' reduction 
of buyer's and seller's surpluses and ensures the deal remains eco-
nomically viable. Through usages, Citibank and Bangkok Bank, and 
New York Broker and Thai Broker, avoid reinventing the wheel with 
each new agreement. To convey intricate information they use short-
. hand verbal expressions which are quickly and exactly articulated 
and immediately and unequivocally understood. Absent such expres-
sions the players would need several minutes to explain their mean-
ings to each other-or worse, several pages of paper to write down 
these meanings. Moreover, the precision of the expressions minimizes 
the probability of costly disputes. There is no conceptual difference 
between expressions like "yours" and "mine," on the one hand, and a 
practice like switches, on the other hand. Both are-or ought to be 
considered-trade usages with critical effects on buyer and seller 
surpluses. In sum, because transaction costs are minimized through 
trade usages, the 5 billion yen transaction is completed or switched 
in minutes, and Citibank and Bangkok Bank move onto another 
potentially lucrative deal. 
One caveat to this analysis should be noted. Although reinvigo-
rating trade usages may increase buyer and seller surpluses, its ef-
fect in a particular transaction should be distinguished from its ag-
gregate effect. For example, if Citibank were disadvantaged by the 
switch of counterparties, then its surplus would be reduced (or even 
eliminated).150 Nonetheless, Citibank may accept this dimunition 
147. The exact figure is $3,555,555.56. 
148. The exact figure is $2,545,454.55. 
149. Of this total, $2 million or JCDI is the loss of Citibank's buyer's surplus, 
and $2 million or HEDI is the loss of Bangkok Bank's seller's surplus. In reality, 
each bank might incur different transaction costs, thus changing the exact amounts 
by which the surpluses are reduced. -
150. That is, if the switch is not a Pareto improvement, then Citibank's sur-
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because it knows that in future transactions it will be in the position 
of demanding a switch. Accordingly, for Citibank the right to a 
switch applicable in all transactions increases its surplus by a mag-
nitude that more than offsets the reduction in its surplus associated 
with any particular transaction. 
B. Why Not a Five Minute Right of Rescission Usage? 
1. The Proposal 
The hesitant approach to switches taken by the Federal Reserve 
and discussed above may reflect legitimate concerns about the integ-
rity of the global currency bazaar and the safety and soundness of 
players therein.151 Nevertheless, this approach is undesirable. Be-
cause of this overhang on the bazaar, the prospects for switches to be 
accepted as a reinvigorated trade usage and thereby a self-regulatory 
device are dim. In addition, future market-based innovations to 
switches ·may be chilled. To encourage a fresh Federal Reserve ap-
proach, the current usage could be modified to address regulatory 
concerns. 
In this regard, a five-minute right of rescission usage--the "5 RR 
usage"-could be established.152 Under a 5 RR usage, each bank 
that had entered into a foreign exchange contract would have five 
minutes from the time it learned of the identity of its counterparty to 
demand a switch, and any switch would have to be completed within 
that same five minute period. 153 If such a demand were made dur-
ing the five minute period, then the contract with the initial 
counterparty automatically would be rescinded. 154 Any demand for 
plus would be reduced. See text accompanying infra notes 186-87. 
151. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
152. Fortunately, an international infrastructure exists to promulgate the pro-
posal as a usage of trade - namely, foreign exchange trading associations like the 
New York Foreign Exchange Committee and the British Bankers' Association. Rep-
resentatives of these bodies could meet, perhaps along with officials from relevant 
bank regulators, to draft and publish an acceptable 5 RR usage proposal. 
153. Section 2-309(1) provides that the time for delivery or any- other action 
under a contract, if not expressly specified in Article 2 or agreed upon by the 
parties, is a "reasonable time." U.C.C. § 2-309(1). Section 1-102(3) empowers the 
parties to determine the standards by which performance is measured, as long as 
those standards are not "manifestly unreasonable." U.C.C. § 1-102(3). Thus, the 
players in the global currency bazaar are fully capable under the U.C.C. to pro-
mulgate the 5 RR. 
154. The five-minute span does not, therefore, affect the contract formation 
process. Rather, it serves as a "cooling off' period akin to a condition subsequent 
where the condition is the acceptance of an ordinary credit risk exposure. 
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a switch after the five minute period would be rejected automatically 
by a foreign exchange broker. A substitute counterparty would have 
to be found and determined to be acceptable to the banks within that 
period. 
The concept of a "suspended animation period"-which is, in 
effect, what the five minutes represent-is not unprecedented in com-
mercial law. For example, in markets for certain goods and services, 
contracts negotiated by a representative of a company who is not 
located in the headquarters of that company are subject to the ap-
proval of the home office. Under such a home office approval clause, 
the contract is not binding until the approval has been received. 155 
The home office might demonstrate its approval by returning a 
signed or initialled written contract, beginning performance, or allow-
ing a specified time period to elapse without taking any action incon-
sistent with formation and performance of the contract. As another 
example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) provides for a limited 
right of rescission with respect to contracts concluded as a result of 
door-to-door sales. In effect, a three day cooling off period is required 
during which rescission is permissible. 156 Like the proposed 5 RR 
usage, in these two instances, the key idea is that there is a short 
period during which neither party to a contract is really bound. 
It would be important to prevent excessive use or abuse of the 5 
RR usage. Accordingly, the only justification for the demand could be 
the necessity to avoid an extraordinary credit risk exposure. "Ex-
traordinary" would be defined to mean that entry into the contract 
would constitute an unsafe and unsound banking practice. In effect, 
the contract would be unsafe and unsound where credit limits or 
account caps are exceeded. Hence, a switch could not be made for 
merely reasonable credit risk concerns because banks are in the busi-
ness of accepting and managing such risks. 
2. Meeting Regulatory Concerns 
A key advantage of the 5 RR usage would be the repercussions 
of the time constraint. The parties to a contract-and their cautious 
regulator-would be uncertain for just five minutes as to whether the 
initial contract will be performed. Thus, the usage would assuage the 
Federal Reserve's first two concerns-those identified above pertain-
155. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 127. Professor Farnsworth discusses 
these clauses from the perspective of contract formation and suggests that a pro-
posal subject to home office approval is not an offer. Thus, the making of the con-
tract is delayed until approval is obtained. 
156. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a)-(c) (1994). 
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ing to open positions and off-market transactions157-because a sub-
stitute counterparty must be found, and risks must be specifically 
ascertainable and quantifiable, within a discrete period. 
Interestingly, there is an alternative possible trade usage that 
would eliminate completely the possibility of an open position, and at 
the same time preserve the right to switch. A bank initiating a for-
eign exchange transaction could tell its broker that the proposed deal 
is "subject to switch." The broker could reiterate this caveat to pro-
spective counterparties. Those counterparties that do not want to 
entertain the possibility of a switch could reject the proposed deal at 
the outset. 
The 5 RR usage also would address the third regulatory concern 
identified above regarding record-keeping and disclosure. 158 The 5 
RR usage would obligate foreign exchange brokers to keep track of 
the five minute time period. Each broker would be responsible for 
informing an appropriate senior manager at the bank for which the 
broker acts as agent that one contract has been rescinded and anoth-
er contract has been substituted in its place. This allocation of duties 
would efficiently resolve the concern about recordkeeping and disclo-
sure because the broker is iri the best position to perform these tasks. 
It is necessarily the broker that informs a bank of the identity of its 
counterparty and handles a demand for a switch of the 
counterparty.159 · 
3. Four New Issues 
In spite of these advantages, there are some difficult issues 
raised by the proposal. First, what notice or evidentiary obligations 
should be incumbent on a bank attempting to exercise the 5 RR us-
age of trade? In the hypothetical case study, suppose Citibank does 
not receive notice from the New York Broker about the switch, per-
haps because of a telecommunications failure. Would the switch be 
effective? 
Second, what should be the legal standard for determining an 
"extraordinary" credit risk? An objective stan.dard of dissatisfaction 
with the potential credit risk exposure obviously would be consistent 
157. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
159. With respect to disclosure, each broker could require that banks for 
which it acts as an agent must provide a list of names of a senior manager to be 
notified in the event the 5 RR usage is exercised. Further, the broker could trans-
mit confirmations electronically to the banks involved in the initial, rescinded con-
tract and those involved in the new, substituted contract. 
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with the pervasiveness of objectivism in contract law jurispru-
dence.160 Yet, credit risk evaluations are innately subjective, as any 
mortgage applicant can attest. What a "reasonable" bank manager or 
Federal Reserve bank examiner thinks about delivering 5 billion yen 
to Citibank and a reciprocal delivery of $49.5 million is a silly inqui-
ry. For Bangkok Bank, but not Fuji Bank, the transaction involves 
an imprudent risk, and the inquiry should end with these subjective 
evaluations. In fact, a subjective standard may promote certainty in 
the exercise of the 5 RR usage. Arguments about reasonableness 
would be immaterial, and the only relevant issue would be whether 
the credit risk posed was "extraordinary" to the particular bank that 
sought the switch. To be sure, however, the only way to eliminate un-
certainty would be to have an absolute right of rescission for any 
reason. 
Third, what if the true reason for a demand to switch 
counterparties is opportunistic? .For example, may Bangkok Bank 
take advantage of a favorable exchange rate movement?161 The un-
derlying issue here is enforcement of the "extraordinary" credit risk 
standard. Presumably, the obligation to act in good faith would apply 
and limit opportunistic behavior.162 Demanding a switch to take ad-
vantage of a favorable exchange rate movement would be considered 
bad faith. 163 More generally, the answer must be that the market 
will police itself. After all, that is what self-regulation through trade 
usages means in practice. Reputational concerns should prevent a 
bank from switching for illegitimate reasons. If a bank behaves 
opportunisitically, then it will be ostracized from the global currency 
bazaar as brokers and traders alike quickly learn of the bank's un-
scrupulous practice. Of course, it must be conceded that self-regula-
160. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 
1870-1960 35-39 (1992); FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 114. Illustrative of the 
objectivist influence is the reasonableness criterion in the definitions of "good faith" 
in Sections 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4), and 4A-105(a)(6). In these Sections, "good faith" 
is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing." U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6). Section 2-
103(1)(b) refers to "the case of a merchant" and "fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. 
§ 2-103(1)(b). This definition is to be contrasted with that in Section 1-201(19) 
which states that "good faith" is "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned." U.C.C. 1-20~(19). . 
161. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (illustrating that Bangkok 
Bank would benefit from a change in the dollar-yen spot rate to 100-99 yen per 
dollar). 
162. See text accompanying supra notes 157-58. 
163. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980). 
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tion will not stamp out all opportunistic behavior-nor would exter-
nal policing mechanisms. 
Finally, exactly how should the players in the global currency 
bazaar move from the current practice of switches, which lacks any 
time constraint or record-keeping and reporting requirements, to the 
5 RR usage, which has these features? The answer must be that the 
players themselves, acting through their trade associations, should 
refine the current practice. They have two incentives to do so. First, 
they may be able to pre-empt Federal Reserve regulation. Second, 
they may be able to avoid adverse judicial decisions. 
If the players do not act, then the Federal Reserve may address 
its three concerns by seeking to bar switches. Certainly, the players 
would resent this strong-arm attempt to stamp out the practice. Its 
probable effect would be to drive some foreign exchange business 
offshore-beyond the reach of the Federal Reserve's regulatory 
grasp-to jurisdictions where switches are permitted. 
In the absence of such regulation, courts may be asked to rule on 
the legitimacy of switches. They may hold that the practice of switch-
es is unreasonable and that switches are unenforceable because they 
are against public policy (namely, the policies espoused by the Feder-
al Reserve). Or, they may hold that while the practice is not unrea-
sonable, the lack of constraints on it is contrary to public policy. 
Accordingly, courts may limit the ability of the players to switch 
counterparties in certain ways. The limitations devised by judges 
may not serve the needs of the players. Moreover, the uncertainty 
associated with leaving the matter to the courts does not serve their 
needs. 
C. Lingering Reservations: Disharmony and Morality 
Encouraging self-regulation in global electronic markets through 
reinvigorated trade usages raises the specters of international dishar-
mony in trade usages and the reign of the morality of the market-
place. With respect to disharmony, heretofore it has been assumed 
implicitly that switches are practiced not only in the major foreign 
exchange trading centers of London, New York, and Tokyo, but also 
in emerging financial centers such as Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and 
Rio de Janeiro. In reality, there may be disharmony in trade usages 
across different centers. For instance, suppose the proposed 5 RR 
usage is established in major but not emerging centers. If Bangkok 
Bank trades dollars for yen with the Singapore office of the Overseas 
Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), then should the 5 RR usage 
apply to the transaction? Global adoption of it would harmonize trad-
ing practices, but foreign exchange players in Singapore-or their 
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regulators-may object to the usage. 
Section 1-205 does not provide guidance in the event of a "choice 
of trade usage" problem. Yet, conflicts among trade usages could lead 
to an outright confrontation between banks from developed countries, 
on the one hand, and banks from newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) and less developed countries (LDCs), on the other hand. 
Should trades between a bank from an LDC and a bank from a devel-
oped country be subject to the 5 RR usage? Perhaps this is a matter 
for express agreement between the banks. In any event, as a matter 
of fairness, a usage in the developed country trading centers should 
not be thrust upon players in centers located in NICs and LDCs. If it 
is, then those players will rightly bemoan the imperialism of devel-
oped country usages. Instead, appropriate consideration must be 
given to unique local market conditions. 
With respect to marketplace morality, Section 1-205 allows mar-
ket participants to dictate usages notwithstanding the moral content 
or implications of those usages. 164 The players in the global curren-
cy bazaar can follow their inherent instincts, namely, to develop 
usages that directly or indirectly contribute to the maximization of 
profits from trading foreign exchange. Bazaar morality triumphs. 
Further, courts lack a statutory standard by which to judge the mor-
al dimensions of a new usage in the context of the bazaar. The result 
may be inconsistent judicial opinions about the same or similar usag-
es.l65 
The solution to the moral dilemma cannot lie with the players 
themselves because they supposedly lack a moral compass .. Other 
safeguards against morally offensive usages must be found. One such 
safeguard exists in Section 2-302. Plainly, a usage that is unconscio-
164. See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the 
Merchant Rules, 100 HARv. L. REv. 465, 505 (1987) (expressing concern about "a 
vision of merchant reality devoid of any normative component or at least devoid of 
any normative component other than speed and efficiency in the marketplace"); 
Danzig, supra note 102, at 627-31 (1975) (arguing that the morality of the market-
place is accepted in the U.C.C. without criticism). For a critique of Danzig's article, 
see Kastely, supra note 97, at 815-17. 
165. Thus, for example, to some courts the practice of switches may be moral-
ly offensive because it effectively allows parties to break promises. When Bangkok 
Bank asks for a switch, it retracts its promise to sell yen and buy dollars. Even if 
Bangkok Bank's communication to sell yen is viewed merely as a revocable offer 
and not a promise, the fact that Bangkok Bank's request for a switch comes after 
the acceptance by Citibank may make the request morally dubious. If indeed con-
tracts must be enforced. because they represent mutual and reciprocal promises, 
then providing a legal foundation for switches through trade usages is potentially 
inconsistent with such enforcement. 
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nable will be struck down.166 However, a court may determine, for 
example, that a switch is not terribly one-sided, nor does it lead to 
oppression or unfair surprise.167 More fundamentally, the concepts 
of a trade usage and unconscionability may be inconsistent. Argu-
ably, no usage should result in oppression or unfair surprise, other-
wise it would not be a usage in the first place. 
Yet, it also can be argued that the power dynamics in a switch 
situation are likely to be particularly important. Perhaps certain 
financial institutions from developing countries-for instance, those 
that are new to foreign exchange trading and lack the maturity and 
sophistication that comes with experience-may be vulnerable. In 
any event, even if unconscionability is a meaningful concept in the 
global currency bazaar, cases where morally questionable trade usag-
es are not so egregious as to be unconscionable may slip through the 
cracks and undermine the integrity of the bazaar. 
A second safeguard is a reasonableness requirement. Official 
comment 6 to Section 1-205 makes clear that one of the ancient re-
quirements of custom carried forward into the U.C.C. is that a usage 
of trade be "reasonable."166 The bulk of scholarly analysis supports 
the conclusion that unreasonable trade usages are not binding. 169 
But, like the first proposed safeguard, a reasonableness requirement 
may provide little protection. As official comment 6 to Section 1-205 
explains, "[t]he very fact of commercial acceptance makes out a prima 
facie case that the usage is reasonable, and the burden is no longer 
on the usage to establish itself as being reasonable." Hence, the 
threshold for establishing reasonableness is low: insofar as switches 
are practiced by a large number of players in different foreign ex-
change trading centers, there is an immediate but perhaps unwar-
ranted presumption that switches are reasonable. An even greater 
shortcoming of this supposed safety mechanism is the fact that re-
gardless of any presumption, reasonableness is not necessarily coex-
r 
166. While Section 2-302 uses the term "contract," as explained above this 
term incorporates "usage of trade." See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, official comment 6 to Section 1-205 explains that Section 2-302 is ap-
plicable to implicit contract clauses that are based on usage of trade. U.C.C. § 1-
205 cmt. 6. 
167. One-sidedness, oppression, and unfair surprise are indicia of uncon-
scionability. See id. 2-302 cmt. 1. 
168. Id. § 1-205 cmt. 6. 
169. See William D. Hawkland, Sales Contract Terms Under the UCC, 17 
U.C.C. L.J. 195, 202 (1985); John E. Murray Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Under-
lying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 
1, 19-20 (1981); Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Con-
tracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 850-51 (1964). 
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tensive with moral worth. Conceivably, a usage could be reasonable 
on commercial grounds but not comport with certain systems of mo-
rality. · 
Communal norms are a third safeguard against morally offen-
sive trade usages. Professor Kastely argues that "[i]f trade usages 
operate as communal norms, then the value of a trade usage can be 
determined by the quality of the community it helps to create .... 
What is needed ... is a language of communal value: terms and 
concepts that can equip courts to consider the quality of communi-
ties."170 The difficulty with this argument is that courts are not in 
the best position to evaluate the quality of financial market commu-
nities. Most judges know little about international financial matters, 
and the higher the court, the more profound the ignorance. It may be 
better to entrust the evaluation of communal norms to a sophisti-
cated regulatory authority. 
Regulatory intervention in private contract affairs certainly is 
not a novel idea. 171 The question for global electronic markets is 
whether authorities such as the Federal Reserve are the appropriate 
guardians of market integrity.172 Certainly, such intervention must 
be infrequent and constrained or it will stifle the development of new 
trade usages. Regulators have a nasty tendency to become part of the 
problem instead of part of the solution when they flex their regulato-
ry muscles too aggressively. In the face of technological change they 
must avoid attempting to maintain the status quo. 
In addition, no regulator can be the sole guardian of the integri-
ty of a global electronic market. The Federal Reserve, for example, 
requires the assistance of regulators of foreign exchange players from 
other countries-most notably the Bank of England and Bank of 
Japan. Yet, here too, the reservation about disharmony and a rich 
country-poor country dispute is relevant. Regulators in major trading 
centers are unlikely to agree on what behavior is morally accept-
able. 173 The probability is near zero when the views of regulators in 
170. Kastely, supra note 97, at 817. 
171. See HOROWITL, supra note 160, at 33-39 (1992) (discussing objectivism 
and the decline of freedom of contract); PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 571-79 (1979) (discussing the increasing acceptability of 
regulatory intervention). 
172. Certainly, the Securities and Exchange Commission plays this role in 
domestic securities markets and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission plays 
this role in domestic futures and options markets. 
173. For example, the Bank of England authorizes points with adequate dis-
closure, while the Federal Reserve opposes the use of points under any circum-
stances. See supra note 47. 
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emerging financial markets are considered. 174 Their concern is cer-
tain to be the growth of the players and markets they regulate. If 
global market activity is not increasing at a healthy pace, then regu-
lators in emerging centers may adopt a zero-sum view: their players 
and markets are in head-to-head competition with players and mar-
kets in developed countries. Accordingly, regulators from NICs and 
LDCs may look suspiciously at a moral condemnation of a usage of 
trade emanating from a regulator like the Federal Reserve. The con-
demnation could be an attempt to increase the percentage of global 
market share of trading activity held by U.S. banks and the New 
York market. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO SWITCHING COUNTERPARTIES 
Why should participants in a global electronic market be permit-
ted to regulate themselves through trade usages when commercial 
codes exist to referee the participants' transactions? Reservations 
about disharmony and morality, as well as concerns of regulators, 
may lead courts and scholars to advocate rule-based regulation rath-
er than self-regulation. Yet, in contrast to trade usages, these rules 
do not always meet the participants' needs. When the rules are ap-
plied, some are left worse off than others, and uncertainties sur-
rounding the transaction are exacerbated. 
A. The Assignment Approach: Not a Pareto Improvement 
Bangkok Bank's attempt to switch out of a foreign exchange 
contract could be characterized as an attempt to assign its right to 
receive $49.5 million from, and delegate its duty to deliver 5 billion 
yen to, Citibank. Article 2 establishes a permissive regime for assign-
ment and delegation. 175 Section 2-210 makes clear that "[a] party 
174. For example, Bank Negara (the central bank of Malaysia) actively trades 
foreign currencies for profit. Most regulators would argue that central banks, be-
cause of their inside information about monetary policy, should not engage in such 
activity. 
175. See U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 1. See generally CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra 
note 82, at 735, 760 (stating that "[i]n contrast with the earlier law the modem 
view is emphatically to the effect that ordinarily . rights are assignable" (citations 
omitted) and that "[t]oday . . . the general proposition is that, subject to excep-
tions, duties are delegable"); FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 748 (stating that 
"[t]oday most contract rights are freely transferable"). 
The relevant RESTATEMENT provisions on assignment and delegation are 
similar to Section 2-210. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at §§ 317-20. No provi-
sions on assignment or delegation are set forth in the C.I.S.G., thus applicable 
local law, such as the U.C.C., would govern an attempted assignment and dele-
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may perform his duty through a delegate ... ,"176 and that "[u]nless 
otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can be as-
signed .... "177 However, assigning the entire contract is not a prac-
tical solution. 
A key· purpose of Section 2-210 is to protect the non-assigning 
party and ensure that its expectations and obligations are not ma-
terially disrupted. 178 From the moment the New York Broker in-
forms Citibank of the identity of its counterparty and Citibank as-
sents, Citibank prepares to exchange foreign currencies with Bang-
kok Bank, not Fuji Bank. Citibank develops specific expectations 
about Bangkok Bank's ability to perform and its own reciprocal du-
ties. It may anticipate that the purported assignee cannot meet these 
expectations, or find that performance rendered to the purported 
assignee would be more burdensome than to the purported assignor. 
Accordingly, Section 2-210(1) precludes Bangkok Bank from 
delegating its duty to deliver 5 billion yen to Fuji Bank if Citibank 
"has a substantial interest in having [its] . . . original promisor per-
form .... "179 Moreover, Section 2-210(5) provides that a delegation 
of performance is reasonable grounds for insecurity and a basis for 
demanding adequate assurance of future performance under Section 
2-609. Finally, Section 2-210(2) does not allow Bangkok Bank to 
gation. 
176. u.c.c. § 2-210( 1). 
177. ld. § 2-210(2). Section 2-210 also establishes a presumption that general 
tenns used to assign a contract include both an assignment of rights and a delega-
tion of duties. Fonnalities are minimized in that under Section 2-210 an assign-
ment need not be in writing and specific words or phrases need not be used. See 
CALAMARI & PERILW supra note 82, at 728. Similarly, Section 2-201 does not 
require an assignment to be written. U.C.C. § 2-201. In any event, by assumption, 
Section 2-201 is abolished. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The statute 
of frauds set forth in Section 1-206 is irrelevant because, as sub-paragraph (2) 
thereof indicates, that Section is inapplicable to a contract for the sale of goods.) 
Thus, Bangkok Bank could simply assign its contract orally to Fl.iji Bank. Of 
course, official comment 7 to Section 2-210 states that the Section is not a "com-
plete statement of the law of delegation and assignment" and recognizes that other 
sources of law may impose requirements on the fonn of an assignment or the need 
for notice of assignment. !d. § 2-210 cmt. 7. . 
178. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 761 (the restrictions on assignment 
in Section 2-210(2) rest "not on any antipathy toward assignment as such, but on 
a concern for the justifiable expectations of the obligor when making the con-
tract."). 
179. The rule applies even though the delegation would not relieve Bangkok 
Bank of a duty to perfonn, or liability for breach, absent the consent of Citibank 
or perfonnance by Fl.iji Bank. Section 2-210(1) provides that "[n]o delegation of 
perfonnance relieves the party delegating of any duty to perfonn or any liability 
for breach." See FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 795. 
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assign its rights to receive $49.5 million if "the assignment would 
materially change the duty of the other party, or increase materially 
the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair materi-
ally his chance of obtaining return performance." 
To be sure, the extant jurisprudence about assignments indicates 
that "in practically every case a right to payment of money is assign-
able."180 The expected receipt of 5 billion yen plainly involves pay-
ment of money, albeit of a foreign currency, from a foreign obligor to 
an offshore bank account. Moreover, a duty to pay money is "general-
ly delegable" and "[i]t is immaterial if the delegate is less 
creditworthy than the delegant because . . . the delegant continues to 
remain liable."181 
Nevertheless, the exceptions in Section 2-210(1)-(2) generate 
uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the assignment of the complete 
dollar-yen contract. With respect to the attempted assignment, 
Citibank could argue its burden is materially increased and its 
chance of obtaining reciprocal performance is materially impaired. As 
for the burden, Citibank may have exhausted its trading limit with 
Fuji Bank. Raising that limit would be a material change in 
Citibank's duties because of the extra risk to which it would be ex-
posed. As for the return performance, Citibank may doubt Fuji 
Bank's ability to deliver 5 billion yen on the value date and worry 
about the attendant Herstatt risk. With respect to the attempted 
delegation, Citibank could argue it has a substantial reason for be-
lieving that delegated performance is not as satisfactory as perfor-
mance by Bangkok Bank. First, Citibank may contend it must rely 
on the integrity, reputation, and skill of its counterparty, thereby 
effectively rendering performance by Bangkok Bank personal.182 
Second, it may claim Bangkok Bank would not exercise any supervi-
sion or control over its purported delegate. 183 
In sum, the central thrust of Citibank's argument is that the 
purported assignment compels it to assume imprudent risks. An ag-
180. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 82, at 735. 
181. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 82, at 761. 
182. See CALIMARI & PERILLO, supra note 82, at 760-6; FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 83, at 798-800. Of course, Citibank is entitled to demand adequate assurance 
from Fuji Bank of its ability to perform pursuant to Section 2-210(5). 
Note that because Citibank objects to the delegation of performance to Fuji 
Bank, a novation - whereby Fuji Bank is substituted for Bangkok Bank as the 
counterparty and the latter is relieved of its duty to deliver 5 billion yen - is 
impossible. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, § 280; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra, 
nte 82 at 758; FARNSWORTH, supra, at 806-07. 
183. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 82, at 762; FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 83, at 800. 
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gressive but not implausible extension of the argument is that expo-
sure to these risks is an "unsafe and unsound practice" in violation of 
federal banking law. The violation subjects Citibank to a civil en-
forcement action brought by federal regulators. 184 
Now a genuine conundrum .exists: Bangkok Bank needs to as-
sign the contract to avoid a bad credit risk, and Citibank needs to 
prevent assignment to avoid a bad credit risk and possibly a lawsuit. 
Applica,tion of the assignment rule becomes a zero-sum game. Herein 
lies a key reason against relying on rule-based regulation. Its appli-
cation leaves one party clearly worse off than under the original 
contract, hence the rule does not yield an efficient outcome. It is not 
a Pareto improvement, because one party is made better off only by 
making the other party worse off.185 In contrast, a switch is a poten-
tial Pareto improvement insofar as at least one party is made better 
off and no one is made worse off. 186 Bangkok Bank is made better 
off by dealing with Fuji Bank. Citibank is not compelled to accept 
Fuji Bank as a counterparty but rather is free to pursue through the 
New York Broker another counterparty. (Of course, depending on ex-
change rate movements, Citibank could be made worse off by losing 
the contract with Bangkok Bank. 187) 
In this zerO-S\UD. game, the identity of the winner cannot be 
predicted accurately. It is unclear whether a court would agree with 
Citibank that the purported assignment and delegation materially 
alters either its risk of return performance or its own obligations. The 
test for whether a performance is nondelegable is "necessarily impre-
cise, "168 and the same is true for the test regarding assignments. 
184. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is statutorily empowered 
to bring cease and desist, removal and prohibition, and civil money penalty actions 
for engaging in unsafe and unsound practices against national banks like Citibank. 
Likewise, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System can bring such 
actions against bank holding companies like Citicorp (Citibank's holding company). 
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(1)-(2), 1818(b)(1), (c)(1), (e)(1)(A)(ii), (i)(2)(B)(i)(II), 
(i)(2)(C)(i)(II). 
185. See RoBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 50 (1988). 
186. See id. Note that "[a] potential Pareto improvement allows changes in 
which there are both gainers and losers, but requires the gainers gain more than 
the losers lose." Id. at 50-51. If this condition occurs, then the gainers can compen-
sate the losers and still have leftover surplus for themselves. Thus, application of 
the assignment rule could be a potential Pareto improvement if Bangkok Bank 
compensated Citibank after assigning the contract to Fuji Bank. As a practical 
matter, however, the form and amount of the compensation is unclear, and admin-
istration of the compensation scheme may be complicated. 
187. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
188. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 798. See also CALAMARI & PERILLO, su-
pra note 82, at 760 (stating that the test regarding non-delegable duties is "most 
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Thus, uncertainty as to whether Bangkok Bank or Citibank will be 
left worse off buttresses the conclusion that the assignment rule is an 
unattractive means of regulating credit risk problems.189 
B. The Adequate Assurances Approach: Uncertainty 
Instead of avoiding an undesirable credit risk by switching 
counterparties, why not require Bangkok Bank to demand adequate 
assurance of future performance from Citibank? Pursuant to Section 
2-609, failure to provide adequate assurances would be a repudiation 
of the dollar-yen contract by Citibank, and Bangkok Bank would be 
entitled to rescind the contract.190 The answer is that-like the ap-
·imprecise"). 
189. Yet another source of uncertainty concerns a possible conflict between 
Sections 9-318 and 2-210. Suppose to protect itself against assignment Citibank 
makes clear to Bangkok Bank through their respective brokers that any contract 
agreed to is not assignable (assume that the writing requirement established by 
Section 9-203(1)(a) is satisfied). Section 9-318(4) renders unenforceable a contractu-
al pro~sion that attempts to prohibit the assignment of an account. U.C.C. § 9-
318(4). A plausible, though perhaps tenuous, argument can be constructed that the 
dollar-yen transaction generates an "account." Therefore, Bangkok Bank might 
point to Section 9-318(4) to justify its argument that it can assign the contract. 
Conversely, Citibank might invoke Section 2-210(1)-{2) to justify its argument that 
the contract is not assignable. 
While Bangkok Bank's argument may be persuasive because Section 9-318 
is more specific than Section 2-210, the argument hinges critically on whether the 
switch involves the sale of an "account." The reasoning that an "account" is in-
volved is dubious. Section 9-106 defines an "account" as "any right to payment for 
goods sold .... " The $49.5 million that Bangkok Bank expects to receive for sell-
ing 5 billion yen at 101 yen per dollar may be an "account" if the yen are consid-
ered "goods." Yen may not qualify as "goods" under the Article 9 definition of that 
term. "Goods" are defined in Section 9-105(1)(h) as "all things which are movable 
at the time the security interest attaches ... , but does not include money .... " 
U.C.C. § 9-105(1(h). "Money" is defined in Section 1-201(24) as "a medium of ex-
change authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government. . . . " Thus, yen 
could be considered "money" because they are authorized by the Japanese govern-
ment and, consequently, would be excluded from Section 9-105(1)(h). 
It might be argued that. the Article 9 definition of "goods" is inapplicable 
because no security interest is involved in the dollar-yen transaction, and that the 
Section 2-105(1) definition of "goods" should be invoked instead. Under that defini-
tion, arguably yen may be considered "goods." See Bhala, supra note 5, at 11-24. 
190. There is no change· in Section 2-609 in revised Article 2, except that it is 
renumbered 2-608. Hence, the above analysis would be unaffected by the enact-
ment of the revision. 
With four exceptions, the common law rule as encapsulated in Section 251 
of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, is the same as Section 2-609. First, under 
Section 251(1) of the RESTATEMENT the obligee can demand adequate assurances 
from the obligor only where failure of performance by the obligor would amount to 
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plication of Section 2-210-using Section 2-609 does not satisfy the 
needs of the parties. That Section fails to provide Bangkok Bank with 
the certainty it requires. 
First, it is not clear whether "reasonable" grounds for insecurity 
exist in the context of a brokered transaction where the identification 
of the counterparties is made after ·a contract is formed by agents 
acting for partially disclosed principals. 191 This question is one of 
fact, 192 thus delineating the term in the abstract is impossible. 193 
a total breach of the contract. In Section 2-609, the limiting factor is "reasonable-
ness." U.C.C. § 2-609. See also text accompanying infra notes 191-97. Second, un-
like Section 2-609(1), RESTATEMENT Section 251 does not require the demand for 
adequate assurances to be in writing. See infra note 188. Third, in contrast to 
Section 2-609(4), RESTATEMENT Section 251(2) does not impose a 30-day limit on 
the time for providing adequate assurance. Fourth, also in contrast to Section 2-
609(4), RESTATEMENT Section 251(2) provides the obligee the choice of treating 
failure to provide adequate assurance as a repudiation. 
The C.I.S.G. does not provide a right to demand adequate assurances of 
future performance. It allows a party to suspend performance of its obligations if: 
[I]t becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial 
part of his obligations as a result of: 
(a) a serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his 
creditworthiness; or 
(b) his conduct in preparing to perform or in performing the 
contract. 
C.I.S.G. Article 71(1), in THE CONVENTION, supra note 49, at 51. This standard for 
suspending performance is narrower than the Section 2-609( 1) "reasonable grounds" 
standard for demanding adequate assurance and suspending performance. See Har-
ry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: The 
Perspective from Article 2 of the U.C.C., 8 J.L. & COM. 53, 96 (1988). Because 
Article 71(1)(a) expressly refers to a deficiency in creditworthiness as a grounds for 
suspension, applying this provision to the Bangkok Bank-Citibank transaction 
would not involve the same degree of uncertainty as applying Section 2-609(1). 
191. Section 2-609(1) states that "[w]hen reasonable grounds for insecurity 
arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing 
demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such assur-
ance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has 
not already received the agreed return." (Emphasis supplied.) 
While the rule contains a writing requirement, certainly a fax should suf-
fice. Indeed, courts have not insisted on the formality of a written demand in 
every circumstance. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 536 F.2d 1167 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (excusing the buyer's failure to put its demand in writing where the 
seller clearly knew the buyer had suspended performance until the seller provided 
adequate assurances). Thus, application of the rule is feasible in global electronic 
markets wherein profits are generated through a large volume of transactions 
executed in a short period of time. 
192. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 96, at 234-35; FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 83, at 643-44. 
193. The difficulty is illustrated by Farnsworth's own statements. On the one 
hand, "[m]ere doubts by one party that the other party will render his perfor-
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Citibank could argue reasonable grounds do not exist because no 
change in circumstances-specifically, its creditworthiness-occurred 
at or after the moment of contract formation. 194 Bangkok Bank 
could argue that the revelation of Citibank by the Thai Broker is 
itself a change in circumstance. 
The guidance provided by Section 2-609(2) that refers merchants 
to "commercial standards" may be of little help other than to expand 
the universe of events beyond those directly related to the dollar-yen 
transaction that might justify Bangkok Bank's demand for adequate 
assurances.195 Must Bangkok Bank actually have done a credit 
analysis on, or have established a trading limit for, Citibank before 
making a demand? Or, can Bangkok Bank act on rumors that 
Citibank's financial condition is "shaky" or it may default on a pay-
ment owed to holders of its commercial paper? 
Second, even if "reasonable" grounds exist, it is not clear what 
assurance of performance would be "adequate. "196 Here again, the 
requirement that "the seller must exercise good faith and observe 
commercial standards" may be unhelpful. 197 No doubt Bangkok 
Bank can insist upon more than what the dollar-yen contract would 
have given it, but it is equally clear that Bangkok Bank's demand 
cannot be excessive. Hence, in practice it is difficult to know a priori 
whether Bangkok Bank's dissatisfaction is based upon reason and not 
mance when due will not excuse the first party from performing." On the other 
hand, "[e]ven without the benefit of the rule of UCC 2-609, if a party believes that 
the other party will not perform, he is free to act on that belief. FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 83, at 641, 643. Moreover, Farnsworth writes that "[m]ere doubts as to 
the other party's solvency . . . do not give the first party the right to suspend 
performance." FARNSWORTH, supra, at 642. However, the authority cited for this 
proposition is dubious: two pre-U.C.C. cases, neither one of which is on point. 
FARNSWORTH, supra, at 642 n.9. 
194. Official comment 1 to Section 2-609 states that "[i]f either the willingness 
or the ability of a party to perform declines materially between the time of con-
tracting and the time for performance, the other party is threatened with the loss 
of a substantial part of what he has bargained for." U.C.C. § 2-609. See also Field 
v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, 305 A2d 689 (Pa. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
1158 (1974). (a demand for additional security is not justified where "there has 
been no change in circumstances to give rise to reasonable ground for insecurity"). 
195. According to these standards "a ground for insecurity need not arise from 
or be directly related to the contract in question." U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 3. To be 
sure, a demand made purely to harass the counterparty would not meet "commer-
cial standards" because, as official comment 3 indicates, the general obligation of 
"good faith" applies. 
196. See id. § 2-609 cmt. 4. See also supra note 190. 
197. U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 4. See supra note 158 (discussing good faith); note 
194 (discussing commercial reasonableness and good faith). 
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arbitrary or capricious.198 Must Citibank post $49.5 million in liquid 
collateral with an escrow agent? Must Citibank obtain a standby 
letter of credit, performance bond, or other guarantee in favor of 
Bangkok Bank? In the fast-paced global currency bazaar, there is no 
time for Bangkok Bank to contact other players (or perhaps even its 
own attorneys) to ascertain whether such actions by Citibank would 
be adequate. Finally, Section 2-609 addresses only the problem of a 
"shaky" bank as a counterparty. What if the basis for requesting a 
switch is that credit limits or account caps have been reached? Thus, 
whether Bangkok Bank's determination of adequacy is unlawful is a 
matter for post hoc adjudication. 
C. Commercial Law Reform: An Apostasy 
If rule-based regulation cannot meet the needs of participants in 
global electronic markets, and regulators are skeptical about self-
regulation through trade usages, then why not rewrite the rules in 
the U.C.C.? Surely two expert, centralized bodies, the American Law 
Institute (ALI) and National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL), can devise new rules to help the likes of 
Bangkok Bank and Citibank and thereby ensure that the U.C.C. 
retains its vitality in high-technology, cross-border contexts. The 
answer is that the participants have immediate needs to be ad-
dressed in the short term, but the ALI and NCCUSL are helpful, if at 
all, only in the long run. In the meantime, the domestic commercial 
law reform process is rather irrelevant to the participants. 
This apostasy runs counter to the American commercial law 
experience of the 1950s and 1960s. Through the coordinated action of 
the ALI and NCCUSL, disparate state laws were harmonized and 
certainty was promoted. Not surprisingly, courts, scholars, and regu-
lators still place their faith in the domestic commercial law reform 
process and urge market participants to find certainty in the resul-
tant rules. Indeed, the regulators have become part of the machinery, 
as evidenced by the high profile role of the Federal Reserve in the 
current projects to revise U.C.C. Articles 2, 5, and 9, recent revisions 
of Articles 3, 4, and 8, and recent drafting of Article 4A.199 Unfortu-
198. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 96, at 234. 
199. For example, with respect to Article 2, see Bhala, supra note 5, at 18-22 
(discussing the aggressively exclusive approach of the Federal Reserve toward the 
application of Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions). Senior Federal Reserve 
lawyers typically hold important and sometimes leadership posts in relevant com-
mittees and subcommittees and, not surprisingly, use these posts to advance Fed-
eral Reserve interests in legal form. 
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nately, however, the positive historical experience cannot be gener-
alized to modern markets whose central features are the (1) use of 
advanced constantly evolving technology and (2) participation of 
parties scattered across the globe. In truth, the continuing relevance 
of the American experience for America itself is dubious and a fortio-
ri for the world. 
Consider the rapid technological developments in the domestic 
computer software industry in relation to the on-going epic struggle 
to promulgate a hub-and-spoke arrangement for Article 2.200 In the 
international arena, consider the evolution of the mechanics of for-
eign exchange trading operations. In the 1950s and 1960s, cable 
transfers and paper-based communications were commonplace. To-
day, negotiations are conducted through satellite telecommunications 
linkages201 or direct computer-to-computer electronic messaging sys-
tems202, and payment obligations are settled via wire transfers.203 
Juxtapose this evolution with the current heated battle over whether 
foreign exchange should be considered a "good" under U.C.C. Section 
2-105(1) and thereby subject to Article 2.204 In both the software 
and foreign exchange markets, the strife highlights the fundamental 
transformation in the posture of the ALI and NCCUSL. 
No longer is the domestic commercial law reform process pro-
active as it might have been in the Age of Llewellyn and Gilmore. 
Today, it can only react to swift, sweeping technological change. As 
drafts of proposed revisions. to Article 2 are circulated and debates 
drag on at revision committee and study group meetings, market 
participants expeditiously resolve uncertainties posed by new technol-
ogies by developing appropriate trade usages. In turn, law draft-
ers-like policemen shooting at a fleeing suspect-are compelled to 
measure their proposed rules in the light of the new usages. By the 
time the proposals are enacted by legislatures in major commercial 
states, another technological revolution may have struck an impor-
tant market, calling into question the continued vitality of the legis-
200. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, 
Spokes, and Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1337 (1994). 
201. See Bhala, supra note 11, at 35-38, (discussing the mechanics of foreign 
exchange trading); Bhala, supra note 5, at 7-10 (discussing the oral, telephonic 
features of foreign exchange trading); KRIEGER, supra note 9, at 17 ("[m]ost trading 
is done verbally . . . [and] [t]hough a limited amount of trading is now being done 
by computer - with electronic verification of trades - the one-on-one voice contact 
is still the primary form of transaction"). · 
202. See supra note 8 (regarding automated data systems such as Minex). 
203. See Bhala, supra note 18, at 374. 
204. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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lation. In contrast, market participants easily cope with the revolu-
tion by devising new trade usages.205 
Globalization of markets compounds the challenge faced by the 
ALI and NCCUSL. The domestic commercial law reform process 
tends to operate with geographic ethnocentrism. Yet, in global elec-
tronic markets, participants located from Atlanta to Athens and 
Williamsburg to Wellington audaciously ignore national boundaries 
in their search for profitable transactions. They confront the central 
fact of commercial law in the international economy: most rules of 
domestic commercial law have little or no extraterritorial effect, but 
the resultant void is not always filled with harmonizing rules be-
cause no world legislature exists to pass commercial statutes binding 
on all parties.206 Indeed, in 1955 the New York Law Revision Com-
205. For instance, the only effect of codifying mercantile terms is to freeze 
their meanings. Thus, the Article 2 Drafting Committee wisely has decided tenta-
tively to scrap the current Sections 2-319 to 2-324. See § 2-319, Reporter's Notes 
(Draft Aug. 1994). 
206. Obviously, there is no General Agreement on Commercial Law (GACL) 
administered by a World Commerce Organization (WCO), akin to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the new World Trad·e Organization 
(WTO). To be sure, organizations such as the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL) make valiant contributions like the C.I.S.G. to-
ward harmonizing commercial law. However, the legal force and effect of even 
UNCITRAL's efforts is limited. 
First, . the process of international commercial law reform is even more 
cumbersome than that of domestic commercial law reform. Indeed, the origins of 
the C.I.S.G. date to the 1930s when efforts to adopt an international sales law 
commenced and resulted in the unsuccessful Convention Relating to a Uniform 
Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 106 and Con-
vention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169. The C.I.S.G. drafting effort 
lasted from 1969 to 1980. See THE CONVENTION, supra note 50, at 3-4. · (For a 
comparative analysis of the treatment of usages of trade in the C.I.S.G. and the 
1964 Conventions, see Stephen Bainbridge, Note, Trade Usages in International 
Sales of Goods: An Analysis of the 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions, 24 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 619, 638-40 (1984)). Thus, like the policeman that arrives at the scene of 
a crime to find the victim, when UNCITRAL agrees on the text of a new conven-
tion, model law, or code, it may be long after market participants developed usag-
es of trade to handle particular problems. 
Second, when the new international legal texts finally enter into force, it is 
impossible to make the rules therein binding on all parties in a global electronic 
marketplace. Obviously, many countries do not adopt the texts. Even for those 
countries that do, the texts contain authorizations for contracting states to take 
reservations to important provisions. For example, as a result of reservations taken 
to Article 1(1)(b) of the C.I.S.G. pursuant to Article 96 thereof by the U.S., China, 
and other contracting states, the C.I.S.G. has a reduced scope of application. See 
supra note 72. See also THE CONVENTION, supra, Table 1 at 65- 67 and 70, 93, 95-
96. As another example, under Article 92( 1), a contracting state can take a reser-
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mission contemplated a "world commercial code, "207 yet the world is 
not much closer to one now than it was when the Commission stud-
ied the U.C.C. Rather, the void is-or can be-filled efficiently by 
self-regulation through trade usages developed by those in the best 
position to manage their uncertainties. 
VII. SUMMARY 
Trade usages should be reinvigorated to accommodate self-regu-
lation in global electronic markets. If a practice qualifies as a usage, 
and if the concept of usages is expanded beyond a mere translation 
device for interpreting disputed terms in a contract, then the practice 
should acquire a firm legal foundation. In turn, market participants 
should know they are authorized to engage in the practice and that it 
creates legal obligations. Armed with this knowledge, they should be 
able to regulate themselves through their trade usages. Switches and 
the 5 RR usage in the global currency bazaar clearly illustrate the 
potential for reinvigorated usages. 
Self-regulation through reinvigorating usages is justified on 
three grounds. First, trade usages not only reduce uncertainty, but 
also protect expectations, provide flexibility, and promote efficiency. 
Second, rule-based regulation generates uncertainties and makes 
certain parties worse off. Third, well-intentioned efforts at reforming 
commercial law do not meet the pressing needs of parties such as 
banks trading foreign exchange, at least in the short- and medium-
term, because of the reactive, cumbersome nature of the reform pro-
cess. Thus, courts and scholars should accredit the foundational role 
of trade usages, and regulators should welcome innovative usages. 
Indeed, as commerce increasingly relies on high technology and de-
vation to part II of the C.I.S.G., hence disharmony in rules regarding contract 
formation is invited. Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have taken this 
reservation. THE CONVENTION, supra, at 58, Table 1 at 65-67. 
Finally, as with the U.C.C., the specific rules in texts such as the C.I.S.G. 
sometimes exacerbate uncertainties for the parties. To enhance the acceptability of 
the texts to member states in the international commercial institutions, ambiguity 
in drafting language is sometimes deliberate. For example, the term "fundamental 
breach" as defined in Article 25 relies on the concept of "substantial" deprivation. 
See THE CONVENTION, supra, at 35. In other instances, certain issues simply are 
left unresolved. See supra notes 77, 95. 
Thus, not surprisingly, multinational trade associations like the Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce (ICC) appear to have far greater influence than any 
international quasi-governmental authority insofar as these associations consolidate 
and publish acceptable market usages. The nearly universal .acceptance of the 
ICC's Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits is a case in point. 
207. See N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 85, at 86. 
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velops cross-border dimensions, courts, scholars, and regulators will 
have little choice to do otherwise. 
